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REFORMING STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS 
TO COMPLY WITH TITLE VI 
Bradford C. Mank* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A major disagreement exists about whether the redevelopment of 
contaminated "brownfield" properties in low-income and minority neigh-
borhoods is essential for economic development in those areas, or 
whether it exacerbates existing cumulative pollution problems in these 
communities. l The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has 
not yet resolved how to balance its interest in promoting economic de-
velopment of brownfields in minority communities with its obligations 
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Ace to prevent states and local 
governments from discriminating against minorities.3 This Article will 
discuss whether state voluntary cleanup statutes violate Title VI and pro-
poses several ideas to reduce the possibility that a brownfield project will 
cause adverse disparate impacts to a minority group. It proposes several 
ways to increase participation by minority communities in the brownfield 
redevelopment process and to collect more and better information about 
possible health impacts on those communities. 
Many developers avoid redeveloping abandoned former industrial 
sites because they fear the environmental liability they may incur in 
cleaning up the property before they can reuse it.4 To address this prob-
* Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987; A.B., 
Harvard, 1983. 
1. See Joel B. Eisen, Brownfield Policies for Sustainable Cities, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
& POL'y F. 187, 219-21 (1999); Paul Stanton KibeI, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, 
Brownfields, and Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 589, 605-13 (1998); infra notes 
10-15 and accompanying text. 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). 
3. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI IMPLEMENTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NEXT 
STEPS FOR EPA, STATE, AND LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS 19-20 (1999) 
[hereinafter REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE]. 
4. See CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND 
REUSING CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES vii-viii, 1-3 (1997); Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. 
Margolis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 3-14 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margo-
lis eds., 1997); Joel B. Eisen, "Brown fields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of Volun-
tary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883, 886-87, 898-912 
(1996); Stephen M. Johnson, The Brownfields Action Agenda: A Model for Future Fed-
eral/State Cooperation in the Quest for Environmental Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 
85 (1996); Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: 
Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 705 (1994); Larry 
Schnapf, State-by-State Survey of Brownfield and Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 28 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 2488, 2488 (Mar. 27, 1998); R. Michael Sweeney, Brownfields Restoration 
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lem, state and federal brownfield programs seek to encourage the redevel-
opment of environmentally contaminated land, especially abandoned or 
underused former industrial sites in impoverished inner-city communities.s 
While EPA has pursued several initiatives to encourage reuse of 
brownfield sites,6 states have supervised most brownfield cleanups.7 By 
1998, forty-four states had voluntary cleanup statutes that frequently reduced 
cleanup standards, limited future environmental liability, and expedited 
administrative approval for many contaminated sites.s EPA has shown 
greater interest in brownfield redevelopment, completing more cleanups 
of large Superfund sites and turning its attention to smaller sites.9 
In theory, developing abandoned and unused contaminated property 
should benefit a community by creating new jobs, expanding the property 
tax base, and eliminating existing pollution.1O Yet state voluntary cleanup 
statutes that authorize relaxed cleanup standards for redevelopment of 
brownfield sites raise troubling questions about whether such projects 
may increase health risks to the surrounding community. 11 After all, 
states, in most cases, would eventually clean up brownfield sites to meet 
strict residential standards, unless the site qualifies for a voluntary action 
program that allows for lower commercial or industrial standards. In par-
ticular, forty-one states consider future land use as a factor in determin-
and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVTL. L. 101 (1995). 
5. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 1-3; Eisen, supra note 4, at 886-88, 
894-95; Becky Jacobs, Basic Brownfields, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 265, 265-
306 (1996-97); infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. 
6. EPA has awarded 227 Brownfield Assessment Demonstration pilot grants of up to 
$200,000 and 16 Showcase Community grants of up to $1 million. See Carol Browner, 
Speech at Brownfields 98 Conference (Nov. 16, 1998); Office of Emergency and Remedial 
Response, U.S. EPA, SUPERFUND REFORMS ANN. REP. FY 1998, at 14, EPA-540-R-99-002 
(1999) [hereinafter SUPERFUND REFORMS]. 
7. See Superfund: States Taking on More Responsibility with Hazardous Waste 
Cleanups, Panel Says, NAT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), Nov. 16, 1998, at d8 [hereinafter BNA 
Superfund] (reporting states have more than 13,700 cleanups in progress, have completed 
more than 5500 in FY 1997 and are also overseeing more than 5000 voluntary cleanups). 
8. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PRO-
GRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, 1998 UPDATE, Table V-22 (1998) [hereinafter ELI SUPERFUND 
REpORT] (reporting as of 1998, 44 states had voluntary cleanup statutes); David B. Hawley, 
The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997: North Carolina Creates an Additional Incen-
tive to Reclaim Contaminated Properties, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1026-27 n.65 (1998) 
(listing states with voluntary action programs); BNA Superjimd, supra note 7, at d8 (re-
porting as of 1998, 44 states had voluntary cleanup statutes); infra notes 80-88 and ac-
companying text. 
9. See Jenna Greene, Super Fight over Superjimd, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 1999, at 10. 
10. See E. Lynn Grayson, Facilitating Good Decision, An Alliance of Necessity: En-
viroJustice and Brownfields, 14 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. (Nov. 1998), at 4; Rodger 
C. Field, Siting, Justice, and the Environmental Laws, 16 N.ILL. U. L. REv. 639, 652 (1996). 
11. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 708-10,767-68; Georgette C. Poindexter, Ad-
dressing Morality in Urban Brownfield Redevelopment: Using Stakeholder Theory 10 Craft 
Legal Process, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 37, 37-38 (1995); Kris Wemstedt & Robert Hersh, 
"Through a Lens Darkly": Superfund Spectacles on Public Participation at BrolVnfield 
Sites, 9 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENV'T 153, 159-60 (1998). 
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ing cleanup standards, allowing less stringent cleanups if the future use 
of a site is likely to be industrial rather than residential. I2 
The environmental justice movement has raised serious concerns 
about whether redevelopment of brownfield sites leads predominantly 
minority inner-city communities to accept disproportionately higher health 
risks in exchange for the possibility of jobs and economic development.13 
Programs allowing less stringent cleanups of brownfield sites may dis-
proportionately affect minority and low-income populations because 
most brownfields are concentrated in predominantly minority and lower-
income inner-city neighborhoods.14 Proponents of brownfields argue that 
redevelopment usually improves both the economic condition and public 
health of surrounding communities.15 
State voluntary cleanup statutes may violate Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,16 which forbids discrimination by programs receiving 
federal financial assistance.17 In February 1998, EPA promulgated a con-
troversial "Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative 
Complaints Challenging Permits" ("Interim Guidance") to help the agency 
resolve a number of pending complaints under that statute. IS Many state 
representatives and industry developers fear that the Interim Guidance's 
12. See BNA SUPERFUND, supra note 7, at d8 (reporting as of 1998 41 states con-
sidered future land use as a factor in determining cleanup standards). 
13. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 887, 1002-03 (arguing brownfield redevelopment 
"may perpetuate environmental inequities by increasing the high degree of risk that af-
fected communities are already forced to bear"); Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and 
Unequal: A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect of Brownfields Programs, 24 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996); Samara F. Swanston, An Environmental Justice Per-
spective on Superfund Reauthorization, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 565, 568-72 
(1994) (arguing reduced cleanup standards for brownfield projects will increase risks to 
poor and minority communities). But see Tara Bums Koch, Betting on Brownfields-Does 
Florida's Brownfields Redevelopment Act Transform Liability Into Opportunity?, 28 STET-
SON L. REV. 171, 215-20 (1998) (arguing that the environmental justice critique that 
brownfield redevelopment trades jobs for health of community is misplaced and that such 
redevelopment usually improves both economic needs and public health of surrounding 
communities); infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text. 
14. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 887, 891, 1001-03; Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield 
Initiatives and Environmental Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity?, 
13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 319 (1997-98); Swanston, supra note 13, at 568-
72; infra notes 23, 122-128 and accompanying text. 
15. See CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL JUSTICE (1998) (discussing federal policy approaches to brownfields redevelop-
ment); Grayson, supra note 10, at 4; Koch, supra note 13, at 197-200. 
16. See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 23-52 (Michael 
Gerrard ed., 1999). 
17. Title VI does not apply to federal programs. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, 
at 25. Nevertheless, EPA's policies for cleaning up and redeveloping brownfield sites may 
indirectly affect how the agency evaluates whether similar state programs violate Title VI. 
18. U.S. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE]; 
Cheryl Hogue, EPA Issues Guidance for Investigating Claims That State, Local Permits 
Are Discriminatory, 66 U.S.L.W. (BNA), at 2504 (Feb. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Hogue, EPA 
Issues]; Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 40-45. 
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broad and vague definition of what constitutes a disparate impact will 
discourage brownfield redevelopment projects.19 So far, however, no citi-
zen has filed a Title VI complaint against a brownfield project.20 
Despite the current absence of Title VI complaints against brown-
field projects, EPA is seeking to revise its Title VI policies to reduce the 
possibility that such complaints could hinder redevelopment efforts. 
Furthermore, EPA is also working to develop a memorandum of under-
standing with brownfield developers to create a sustainable redevelop-
ment process that addresses environmental quality and equity issues.21 
Nevertheless, EPA's Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee ob-
served in its March 1, 1999 report that its members disagreed about 
whether the economic benefits of brownfield redevelopment outweighed 
its possible adverse health impacts in minority communities.22 
While there is considerable uncertainty about how EPA will enforce 
Title VI, there are reasons to believe that state brownfield programs may 
violate the statute. First, state brownfield programs are likely to approve 
individual projects that disproportionately affect minority groups because 
the programs fail to address disproportionate or cumulative impacts. Sec-
ond, state brownfield programs are systemically flawed because they of-
ten allow lower health standards in industrial or nonresidential areas. Be-
cause minorities are more likely to live in nonresidential or industrial 
areas,23 state brownfield statutes or regulations disproportionately in-
crease health risks to minority groups. 
EPA is currently revising its Title VI policy, but states can and 
should adopt three reforms now to prevent their brownfield programs 
from causing disparate impacts, thereby avoiding potential Title VI 
claims. First, states should amend their voluntary action programs to re-
quire developers to collect data about the racial demographics and rela-
19. See Stephen C. Jones & Annop G. Shroff, Balancing Growth and the Environ-
ment: Environmental Justice Concerns Delay Industrial Expansion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLI-
ANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, No.5, 1 (1997) (arguing EPA's environmental justice and Title 
VI policies threaten to undermine its brownfield policies); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 
4~; Environmental Justice Policy to Hurt Brownjields, SupeTj'und Revitalization, HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Oct. 5,1998; infra notes 253-257 and accompanying text. 
20. See EPA Defends Environmental Justice Policy, Process to Bliley, ENVTL. POL'y 
ALERT, Dec. 30,1998, at 30-31. 
21. See EPA, Stakeholder Group to Launch New Brownjields Redevelopment Pro-
gram, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Mar. 24, 1999, at 9. 
22. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 19-20. 
23. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land 
Use Regulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REv. 1, 80-89 (1998) (study of 31 census tracts in seven 
cities nationwide found that industrial and commercial zoning is more common in low-
income, high-minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low-minority neighborhoods); 
see also Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND 
THE AMERICAN DREAM 101, 102-20 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1990) 
(presenting case studies of "expulsive zoning" where cities from 1917 through at least 
1930s re-zoned minority residential areas to allow intensive industrial or commercial use, 
often with intent to reduce minority populations). 
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tive burden of pollution in several neighborhoods surrounding brownfield 
projects. States should require developers to consider whether their proj-
ect will ·cause adverse disparate impacts against a minority group. Fur-
thermore, states should require developers to examine mitigation meas-
ures and to determine whether less discriminatory or environmentally 
damaging alternatives exist. 
Nevertheless, developers should have the opportunity to justify a 
project that has some disparate impacts by showing that the benefits ex-
ceed the costs and that alternative sites are not available. Title VI need 
not interfere with legitimate redevelopment of brownfield sites as long as 
such projects reasonably address the health and economic needs of all 
members of a community.24 
Finally, states should establish procedures for early and meaningful 
public participation in their decision-making process for approving 
brownfield projects. While those with the most knowledge, wealth, and 
political resources are best able to utilize opportunities for public partici-
pation, even the poorest and weakest members of society have a better 
opportunity to influence environmental decision-making if there are ef-
forts to encourage participation by a diverse and broad segment of the 
public. Unfortunately, most state brownfield programs restrict public 
participation in the approval process.25 
EPA should reward states that adopt these reforms by giving greater 
deference to their decisions, including expediting review of possible civil 
rights complaints and imposing lesser penalties if a well-intentioned state 
occasionally makes poor decisions. For example, when the agency evalu-
ates a Title VI complaint against a state or local government, EPA should 
take into account whether the state or local government considered com-
munity views about a project's risks and benefits to different subpopula-
tion groups. However, the agency should not automatically defer to states 
without examining whether their reforms are actually effective. Further-
more, the mere opportunity for public participation in a state program is 
not enough to warrant EPA giving deference to a state's decision-making. 
A state or local agency must show that it seriously considered public 
comments about a proposed project's economic benefits and the possibil-
ity of less discriminatory alternatives to be entitled to a measure of def-
erence from EPA. 
EPA has recognized that the ultimate goal of brownfield redevelop-
ment projects is to create sustainable projects that benefit a community 
24. See Leslie Goff-Sanders, Brownfield Legislation: A Viable Option for the South-
east, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 141, 146 (1996-97) ("So long as state legislatures 
avoid implementing cleanup standards that are too relaxed in urban areas, the revitalization 
of the urban areas should please both environmental justice advocates and urban redevel-
opment advocates."); Grayson, supra note 10, at 4. See generally Johnson, supra note 4, at 
96-97. 
25. See Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 11, at 159-60. 
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over the long-run and that do not result in the reversion of the property to 
brownfield status in the future.26 The proposed reforms would promote 
sustainable brownfield projects that are reasonably safe and provide long-
term benefits to a diverse range of community groups. 
Part II of this Article will explain how state and federal liability 
provisions inhibit redevelopment of brownfields. Part III will discuss the 
common and varying features of state voluntary action programs. Part IV 
will explain environmental justice concerns about brownfields. Part V 
will provide a brief overview of Title VI. Part VI will examine whether 
state voluntary cleanup statutes violate Title VI. Part vn will make sev-
eral recommendations for creating state brownfield programs that do not 
violate Title VI. 
II. BROWNFIELDS AND REDEVELOPMENT 
A. Brownfields 
1. Defining Brownfields 
Most commentators define a brownfield site as abandoned or 
underused former industrial land that is difficult to redevelop because of 
existing or possible environmental contamination.27 Developers usually 
seek to redevelop such properties if they have only a small to moderate 
amount of contamination.28 Such less contaminated sites include former 
industrial facilities, warehouses, gas stations, and dry cleaners.29 Most 
brownfields are located in inner-city neighborhoods that were centers of 
industry in the past.30 These areas now contain predominantly minority 
and lower-income populations.31 Since the 1940s, industry has shifted to 
"greenfield" locations in the suburbs, which are predominantly white.32 
Although the precise number of sites remains unknown, estimates 
range from tens of thousands to half a million sites; it could cost as much 
as $650 billion to clean up all of these properties.33 
26. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, A Sus-
TAINABLE BROWNFIELDS MODEL FRAMEWORK, i, viii, 3-4, 46, 113, EPA-500-R-99-001 
(Jan. 1999) [hereinafter EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS]. 
27. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and lnstitll-
tional Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. I, 3-4 (1997); Eisen, supra 
note 4, at 890-91; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 707 n.3. 
28. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901; Johnson, supra note 4, at 94. 
29. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 890-91. 
30. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2-3; Eisen, supra note 4, at 890-
91; see also Buzbee, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
31. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 891; see also Buzbee, supra note 27, at II. 
32. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 891-92; Johnson, supra note 4, at 95; McWilliams, 
supra note 4, at 717-22. 
33. See, e.g., Brownfield Redevelopment: Hearings on S. 8 Before the Comm. 011 
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2. Advantages of Redeveloping Brownfields 
Abandoned brownfield sites often pose significant economic bur-
dens and health risks to surrounding communities.34 Abandoned sites do 
not provide jobs and yield lower property tax revenues.35 In addition, va-
cant sites may be magnets for crime and encourage illegal dumping that 
worsens environmental contamination at the facility.36 The presence of 
vacant property also may discourage economic development.37 Finally, 
such sites may contain environmental contamination that can spread to 
surrounding property.38 
Redeveloping brownfield sites offers several advantages. Redevel-
opment of these sites can create new jobs, provide property tax revenues, 
and eliminate existing environmental contamination.39 In addition, brown-
field redevelopment avoids the often substantial environmental costs of ex-
ploiting "greenfield" locations40 because brownfield areas usually already 
contain infrastructure such as roads, railroads, water, and sewer sys-
tems.41 By contrast, developing a greenfield often requires developers to 
build infrastructure, imposing substantial new costs on the environment.42 
Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo (Mar. 4,1997) (Prepared Testimony of Timothy Fields, 
Acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. 
EPA) (reporting that best available estimate is that 450,000 brownfields exist); Davis & 
Margolis, supra note 4, at 6 (estimating 130,000 to 450,000 contaminated sites); Barbara 
Ruben, ENVTL. ACTION, Jan. 1, 1995, at 12 (reporting 130,000 to 425,000 brownfield sites). 
34. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2-3; Hawley, supra note 8, at 
1017-18; Eric D. Madden, Comment, The Volulltary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment 
Act-The Limits of the Kansas Brownfield Law, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 593 (1998). 
35. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2-3; Madden, supra note 34, at 
595; Sarah Rubenstein, Comment, CERCLA's Contribution to the Federal Brow1ljields Prob-
lem: A Proposalfor Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149,150 (1996-97). 
36. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2; Davis & Margolis, supra note 4, 
at 6-7; Jacobs, supra note 5, at 266-67; Madden, supra note 34, at 595-96. 
37. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2; Davis & Margolis, supra note 4, 
at 6-7. 
38. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2; Davis & Margolis, supra note 4, 
at 6-7; Madden, supra note 34, at 595-96. 
39. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 894-95; see also McWilliams, supra note 4, at 710, 
714-17; infra notes 194-195 and accompanying text. 
40. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 890-91, 895-96 (avoiding brownfield redevelopment 
will likely spread industrial pollution to greenfields); McWilliams, supra note 4, at 717-
22, 725 (greenfield development often damages the environment and usually shifts jobs 
from cities to suburbs); Ruben, supra note 33, at 12 (quoting EPA Administrator Carol 
Browner). 
41. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 896-97. See generally McWilliams, supra note 4, at 
717-22,725. 
42. See Johnson, supra note 4, at 95; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 717-22, 725; 
Madden, supra note 34, at 596. 
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B. Federal and State Liability 
The fear of both state and federal environmental liability discour-
ages brownfield redevelopment.43 
1. Federal Liability 
a. CERCLA 
The greatest risk of liability arises under the federal Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 
which classifies past and present property owners of any site contami-
nated with a "hazardous substance" as potentially responsible parties that 
are subject to strict, joint, several, and retroactive liability.44 Prospective 
purchasers of contaminated property are likely to be subject to full li-
ability for all past contamination unless they negotiate an agreement with 
EPA before buying the site.45 Under CERCLA and similar state statutes, 
the property owner or facility operator may be liable for past contamina-
tion at a site even if they did not cause that contamination.46 Since pro-
spective purchasers of contaminated property are generally liable under 
CERCLA for cleaning up any past contamination, the cost of cleanup 
strongly discourages purchasers.47 Cleanup costs can range from tens of 
thousands to millions of dollars and can easily exceed the value of the 
contaminated property.48 
In some circumstances, Congress or EPA has limited liability under 
CERCLA. For instance, an "innocent" purchaser who had no reason to 
know that contamination existed at a site is free from liability, but only if 
the purchaser conducted an appropriate environmental audit that found 
no hazardous substances.49 Few owners have qualified for this defense. 
Additionally, in 1996, Congress enacted legislation providing qualified 
43. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 898-912; Johnson, supra note 4, at 97-98; McWil-
liams, supra note 4, at 725-27; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 113-14. 
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-(4) (1994) (defining liability of past and present owners 
of properties or vessels contaminated with hazardous substances, as well as transporters 
and those who arranged for disposal); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 269-70 (discussing joint and 
several liability under CERCLA). 
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (defining liability of past and 
present owners of properties or vessels contaminated with hazardous substances); see also 
BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 5-6; Jacobs, supra note 5, at 269-70; Johnson, 
supra note 4, at 98-99 (discussing joint and several liability under CERCLA). 
46. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901-05; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 725-27. 
47. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 904-05; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 727-28. 
48. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 8; Hawley, supra note 8, at 1021; see also Ruben-
stein, supra note 35, at 161-63 (discussing uncertain and expensive costs of cleanups un-
der CERCLA). 
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), (B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Brian C. Walsh, 
Seeding the Brownfields: A Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental Liability for Pro-
spective Purchasers, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 196-97 (1997). 
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liability protection for lenders who do not become involved in the man-
agement of a facility to encourage lenders to finance development of pos-
sibly contaminated properties.50 
When prospective purchasers seek to buy contaminated property, EPA 
will sometimes limit liability through a prospective purchaser agreementY 
The agency's 1989 policy regarding prospective purchaser agreements 
was extremely restrictive. To qualify for limited liability, a developer had 
to provide the agency with a "substantial benefit" by either performing 
cleanup work itself or reimbursing the agency for its response costS.52 
In 1995, EPA issued a revised prospective purchaser guidance that is 
more sympathetic toward developers.53 The 1995 guidance expands the 
coverage of these agreements beyond sites where EPA enforcement ac-
tion is expected, and includes properties where there has already been 
federal involvement. In addition, the 1995 guidance relaxes the "substan-
tial benefit" requirement to include not only direct monetary and cleanup 
benefits, but also indirect public benefits in combination with a reduced 
direct benefit to EPA.54 Yet, the 1995 guidance is still limited to the small 
minority of contaminated sites with which EPA is involved and does not 
address the larger number of sites that are wholly within the jurisdiction 
of state or local governments.55 
Prior to the publication of the 1995 guidance, EPA had entered into 
only twenty agreements, but in the first three years under the 1995 policy 
the agency referred eighty additional agreements to the Department of 
Justice, including seventy final agreements.56 Nevertheless, the 1995 
policy is fairly restrictive because the purchaser could be liable for con-
tamination unknown at the time an agreement is signed, and these 
agreements are limited to purchasers of National Priorities List ("NPL") 
sites57 or properties where EPA anticipates enforcement action.58 A final 
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1994 & Supp. ill 1997) ("The term 'owner or op-
erator' ... does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a vessel 
or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel 
or facility."); id. § 9601(20)(E) (limiting lender liability); Buzbee, supra note 27, at 14. 
51. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated 
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995); John-
son, supra note 4, at 108-09; Walsh, supra note 49, at 205-07. 
52. Superfund Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235, 34,241-42 (1989); Eisen, supra note 
4, at 983; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 744-45. 
53. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated 
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,792; Walsh, 
supra note 49, at 205-07. 
54. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated 
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,794. 
55. See id. at 34, 793. 
56. See SUPERFUND REFORMS, supra note 5, at 16. 
57. NPL sites are often referred to as Superfund sites because the agency may only 
spend special tax funds placed in the Superfund trust on such sites. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9605(a)(8) (1994); 40 C.ER. § 300.3 (1998) (stating cleanups of NPL sites must follow 
National Contingency Plan); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 267-68. 
58. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated 
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restriction on the purchaser agreements is that the Department of Jus-
tice's Assistant Attorney General must provide "concurrence" of every 
prospective purchaser agreement.59 
Accordingly, there is no broad protection yet for brownfield devel-
opers. For potential brownfield redevelopers, the threat of CERCLA li-
ability creates huge obstacles because the costs of remediating a site are 
often uncertain and there are often significant delays before a cleanup 
can be approved by state or federal officials.60 Furthermore, if contami-
nation is found in the future, nothing protects the developer from addi-
tionalliability.61 
While the threat of CERCLA liability obstructs developers from re-
developing contaminated sites, not all brownfields are subject to stringent 
federal cleanup rules. EPA focuses on the worst sites and gives states 
primary jurisdiction over less contaminated properties. EPA uses a nu-
merical scoring system, the Hazard Ranking System ("HRS"),62 to place 
the most contaminated sites on the NPL.63 The agency's main focus is on 
remediating the approximately 1300 sites on the NPL.64 However, the 
agency has recently shifted its focus to smaller brownfield sites because 
it has completed many Superfund c1eanups.65 The agency has jurisdiction 
over any site that contains a "hazardous substance," which includes virtu-
ally all toxic substances and chemicals except petroleum.66 The agency 
also keeps a list of several thousand potential Superfund sites on its 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Information System ("CERCLIS") database, but has deleted over 30,000 
sites, about seventy-five percent of the 42,000 sites, from that list be-
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. at 34,792; Eisen, sllpra 
note 4, at 983-84; see also Wendy Wagner, Overview of Federal and State Law Governing 
Brownjields Cleanups, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15, 25-26 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
59. See Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated 
Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,795 (1995). 
60. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901,906-10; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 110. 
61. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 910-11; Andrea Lee Rimer, Environmelltal Liability 
and the Brownjields Phenomenon: An Analysis of Federal Options for Redevelopment, 10 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 93-94 (1996). 
62. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c)(I) (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c)(I), 
9605(g)(2)(B) (1994); Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evollltion of BrolVnjields, 21 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y 'REV. 265, 270-71 (1997) (discussing Hazard Ranking 
System). 
63. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9605(a)(8), 9605(c), 9611 (1994) (Superfund); 
40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1998); Wagner, supra note 58, at 16-17; Wernstedt & Hersh, sllpra note 
II, at 156. 
64. See BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 2 (EPA has identified about 1300 
high-priority NPL sites); see also BNA SUPERFUND, supra note 7, at d8 (indicating that as 
of 1998, EPA had listed about 1,300 NPL sites and was planning to add approximately 200 
more in the next two years). 
65. See Greene, supra note 9, at 10. 
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994) (defining the term "hazardous substance"); 40 
C.F.R. § 302.4 (1998) (same). 
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cause the agency realizes that the stigma and cleanup uncertainties asso-
ciated with such a listing may discourage redevelopment.67 
Developers normally avoid heavily contaminated sites on EPA's Su-
perfund or CERCLIS lists because the agency's complicated rules for 
cleaning up such sites makes it very expensive to redevelop them and many 
states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal NPL sites.68 Still, there are 
tens of thousands of potential brownfield sites that contain a small to moder-
ate amount of contamination and are primarily under state jurisdiction. 69 
b. Limiting Federal Liability 
While states cannot limit federal liability without EPA approvaVo 
EPA has cautiously moved to give states greater authority to set cleanup 
standards. Traditionally, EPA officials have been reluctant to cede final 
cleanup authority to states or to spend administrative resources reviewing 
state agreements with developers.71 However, to facilitate brownfields 
redevelopment, EPA can issue a comfort/status letter (i.e., a "No Current 
Federal Superfund Interest Letter") to a developer or a "State Action 
Letter" to a state. These letters are issued when the agency does not in-
tend to exercise its CERCLA jurisdiction because the owner is cooperat-
ing with state authorities in performing a cleanup. Such letters are not 
binding on the agency.72 The agency has issued at least 300 com-
fort/status letters.73 
Furthermore, in 1997, EPA issued a final draft guidance that encour-
aged state voluntary cleanup programs by allowing the agency to enter 
into an agreement with a state. The agency agreed not to exercise its 
CERCLA cleanup authority at low-risk sites undergoing a voluntary 
cleanup according to state rules approved in the agreement.14 The agency 
67. See SUPERFUND REFORMS, supra note 5, at 2,15. 
68. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-16-303(3)(b)(I) (West 1998); FLA. STAT. 
ch. 376.82(1) (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.02 (West 1999); see Eisen, supra note 
4, at 923 (stating that most states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal NPL sites); John-
son, supra note 4, at 94, 98 (noting that most developers do not consider NPL sites to fit 
the definition of "brownfield"); Hawley, supra note 8, at 1039-40. 
69. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 901-02. 
70. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 15-16; Johnson, supra note 4, at 105-06; Walsh, 
supra note 49, at 210. 
71. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 15-16. 
72. See Policy on the Issuance of Comfort/Status Letters, 62 Fed. Reg. 4624 (1997); 
Jacobs, supra note 5, at 275; Frona M. Powell, Amending CERCLA to Encourage the Re-
developmellt of Brownfields: Issues, Concerns, and Recommendations, 53 WASH. U. J. 
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 113, 126-27 (1998) (discussing "comfort letters" for prospective 
brownfield purchasers). 
73. See SUPERFUND REFORMS, supra note 5, at 17. 
74. See Notice of the Availability of Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund 
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Pro-
grams, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495 (1997); Superfund Reauthorization: Hearings on S. 8 Before 
the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Congo (1997) (statement of Carol 
Browner, U.S. EPA Administrator); Koch, supra note 13, at 209 (describing Florida's ef-
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reached such memoranda of agreement ("MOA") with eleven states.7S 
However, in late 1997, the agency withdrew that final draft guidance be-
cause of conflicting public comments on revising it, but left the eleven 
existing MOAs in effect.76 Even where EPA has not entered into an 
agreement with a state, the agency is unlikely to reopen a state-approved 
voluntary cleanup.77 
2. State Liability 
Brownfield developers are subject to state liability as well as federal 
liability, but states often are willing to limit state liability for legitimate 
brownfield redevelopment projects. At least forty-five states have enacted 
hazardous waste statutes that may raise additional liability issues for de-
velopers because CERCLA does not preempt parallel or more stringent 
state hazardous waste and cleanup laws.7s Many state "mini-CERCLA" 
laws also apply expansive, strict, joint and several liability on both pres-
ent and past property owners.79 
III. STATE VOLUNTARY ACTION PROGRAMS 
Most states have enacted legislation or promulgated regulations that 
encourage developers voluntarily to clean up contaminated properties.80 
While federal programs have had some effect in encouraging brownfield 
redevelopment, state voluntary action programs have had far more impact 
for two reasons. SI First, most sites fall under state jurisdiction because 
forts to negotiate a MOA with EPA). 
75. See BNA Superfund, supra note 6, at d8 (reporting statement of Earl Salo, EPA's 
assistant general counsel for Superfund). 
76. See Memorandum from Timothy Fields, Acting Assistant Administrator, Office 
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, & Steven A. Herman, Assistant Ad-
ministrator, EPA's Office of Compliance Assurance, to EPA Regional Administrators, 
Withdrawal of Proposal: Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda of 
Agreement Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs (Nov. 26, 1997) (on file with 
Harvard Environmental Law Review); Eisen, supra note 1, at 207-12. 
77. See Buzbee, supra note 27, at 16. 
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1994) (stating that CERCLA does not preempt state 
law); id. § 9614(b) (clarifying that multiple recovery of same costs not allowed under both 
state and federal law); see also 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5122-2 (West 1998); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-31O to 130A-31O.13 (1999); 
Abrams, supra note 62, at 267-68 (noting that at least 45 states have statutes similar to 
CERCLA). 
79. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 376.30-.319 (1997); IOWA CODE § 455B.381-.399 
(1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:l to B:15 (1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, 
§ 6020.101-.1305 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-6 to -7 (1996). Em see TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 68-212-207(A)-(B) (1996) (mandating that courts examine fault as well as 
equitable factors in apportioning liability); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-31O(2)(g) (1998) 
(rejecting explicitly joint-and-severalliability). 
80. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 915-27; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 121-23. 
81. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 914-15. 
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EPA focuses on NPL or CERCLIS sites, which are only a small percent-
age of all contaminated properties.82 Second, states have generally been 
far more willing than EPA to accept cleanups that only reduce contami-
nation to levels safe for industrial use.83 
A. Common Elements in State Brownfield Programs 
There are common elements in most state brownfield programs.84 
First, all are voluntary and do not require property owners to join.85 Sec-
ond, most states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal NPL sites.86 Third, 
state voluntary action statutes and programs generally streamline the 
cleanup approval process.87 Most importantly, state voluntary action stat-
utes and programs usually set forth statewide cleanup standards that al-
low for higher levels of risk than the Superfund program if a site will be 
used for commercial or industrial rather than residential purposes.88 Fi-
nally, voluntary action statutes and programs typically limit a developer's 
liability against state enforcement actions89 through (1) "no action" let-
ters, which indicate that a state probably will not pursue further enforce-
ment actions unless new information about contamination is discovered;90 
(2) covenants not to sue, which provide express protection that a state 
will not pursue further enforcement actions;91 (3) releases from state 
CERCLA liability;92 and (4) certificates of completion indicating that a 
cleanup meets applicable state standards.93 
B. Three Types of State Voluntary Cleanup Statutes 
States have adopted a variety of different cleanup standards to en-
courage voluntary cleanups, but they generally fall into three major cate-
82. See id. at 923 (indicating that most states prohibit voluntary cleanups of federal 
NPL sites); Sweeney, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.329 (listing California, Colorado, Mon-
tana, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania statutes as specifically prohibiting voluntary 
cleanups offederal NPL sites); supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
83. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 909-10. 
84. See id. at 915-27. 
85. See id. at 920. 
86. See id. at 923; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 157-58 n.329 (listing California, Colo-
rado, Montana, New York, Ohio as specifically prohibiting voluntary cleanups of federal 
NPL sites); Madden, supra note 34, at 612-13 (stating that Kansas excludes NPL sites 
from its voluntary action program). 
87. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 920. 
88. See id. at 920, 936-49. 
89. See id. at 921,950-65. 
90. See id. at 952-54. 
91. See id. at 955-56; Johnson, supra note 4, at 102; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 163. 
92. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 957-58. 
93. See id. at 956-57; Sweeney, supra note 4, at 163. 
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gories: (1) background standards; (2) model state-approved generic risk-
based cleanup standards; and (3) site-specific standards.94 Some states 
allow developers considerable freedom in choosing among these three 
approaches.95 
1. Background Standards 
A background standard is usually the most stringent approach be-
cause it requires a developer to reduce the level of contamination to the 
conditions present at the site before the contamination occurred.96 Some 
states do not allow institutional controls, which include physical barriers 
such as fencing, or legal restrictions on future land use to meet back-
ground standards, although they may be used to maintain them after a 
cleanup.97 Perhaps because of a fear that meeting background standards 
may be very expensive, some states treat background standards as an op-
tion for a developer to select, but do not require that they must be met.98 
Some states define background levels of contamination in terms of 
the generally prevailing levels in the surrounding area.99 In Illinois, the 
94. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8.5 (West 1997) (providing a three-tier 
system for cleanup levels: (1) "background" levels; (2) site-specific, risk-based standard 
depending upon future use of the site; (3) either background levels or generic risk-based 
standards using statewide standards developed by state department of environmental pro-
tection); IOWA CODE § 455H.201 (1999) (providing three types of cleanup standards: 
(1) "background" standards; (2) statewide standards; and (3) site-specific standards): Tho-
mas G. Kessler, The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pe/l11-
sylvania Tells CERCLA Enough Is Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 184-94 (1997) (dis-
cussing Pennsylvania's three cleanup standards: (1) background levels; (2) statewide health 
standards; and (3) site-specific standards). 
95. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(1)-(2) (West 1998); OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE § 3746-300-08 to -09 (1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 6026.301, 
6026.303, 6026.304 (West 1999); see also Eisen, supra note 4, at 948. 
96. See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-5-8.5(b)(I) (West 1997) (defining "background 
levels" as the level of "hazardous substances that occur naturally on the site"); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.103 (West 1999) (defining "background" standards as "[t]he concen-
tration of a regulated substance determined by appropriate statistical methods that is pres-
ent at the site, but is not related to the release of regulated substances at the site"); James 
W. Creenan & John Q. Lewis, Pennsylvania's Land Recycling Program: Solving the 
Brownfields Problem with Remediation Standards and Limited Liability, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 
661, 677-79 (1996) (discussing the definition of "background standards" under Pennsylva-
nia statute); Alexander H. Tynberg, Oregon's New Cleanup Law: Short-Term Thinking at 
the Expense of Long-Term Environmental and Economic Prosperity, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 471, 474 (1997) (defining "background" levels). 
97. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(b)(4) (West 1999); Steven F. Fairlie, The 
New Greenfields Legislation: A Practitioner's Guide to Recycling Old Industrial Sites, 5 
DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 77, 84 n.43 (1996). 
98. See IOWA CODE § 455H.201 (1999) (allowing developer to choose "background" 
standards as an option); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 7-508(b)(3) (1998) (participant in vol-
untary cleanup has option to select background levels as cleanup standard); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302 (c) (West 1999). 
99. See, e.g., 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5158.2 (West 1998) (defining "area background" 
standard), id. 5158.5(b)(l) (remediation must achieve "area background levels" unless 
exception applies); 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 742.400-.415 (1996) (regulations for 
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"area background" standard explicitly includes not only background lev-
els naturally present in the soil, but also contamination from areawide 
releases outside the site. loo Accordingly, in Illinois, the area background 
standard in a heavily industrial or commercial location is likely to be less 
protective of human health and the environment than in a primarily resi-
dential neighborhood.101 Illinois explicitly recognizes that a cleanup to 
area background levels may not be sufficiently safe to permit future resi-
dential development or may even pose "an acute threat to human 
health."I02 
Some proponents of environmental justice argue that all properties 
should meet rigorous background standards to avoid the possibility of 
harm to minority communities.103 Developers respond that a rigorous 
background cleanup standard may not make sense if a permanent cleanup 
is impractical or the costs exceed the benefits. For instance, it may be 
impractical to "pump and treat" contaminated groundwater on a site if 
the surrounding aquifer is contaminated and will re-contaminate the 
groundwater. 104 
determining "area background" concentrations for contaminants of concern at site); David 
L. Reiser, A Practical Approach to Brownfields: An Overview of TACO and the SRP, 86 
ILL. B.J. 262, 264-65 (1998) (discussing illinois' "area background" standards); see also 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.302(b)(I) (West 1999) (listing criteria for attainment of the 
background standard); Kessler, supra note 94, at 187-88 (discussing Pennsylvania's back-
ground standards). 
100. See 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/58.2 (West 1998) (defining "area background" to 
refer to regulated substances "consistently present in the environment in the vicinity of a 
site that are the result of natural conditions or human activities, and not the result solely of 
releases at the site."); id. § 5/58.5(b)(I) (remediation must achieve "area background lev-
els" unless exception applies); 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 742.400-.415 (1996) (regu-
lations for determining "area background" concentrations for contaminants of concern at 
site); David L. Reiser, Brownfields Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 
621, 626-27 (1996) (Illinois allows use of "area background" standards that take into ac-
count areawide releases outside the site and thus allows lesser cleanups in industrial areas 
as long as contamination does not pose an acute risk to workers on the site). 
101. 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/58.2 (West 1998) (defining "area background" stan-
dards), id. § 5/58.5(b)(1) (remediation must achieve "area background levels" unless ex-
ception applies); 35 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 742.400-.415 (1996) (regulations for de-
termining "area background" concentrations for contaminants of concern at site); Reiser, 
Brownfield Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, supra note 100. 
102. 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. § 5/58.5(b)(3) (West 1998); see also 415 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. § 5/58.5 (b)(2) (if concentration of regulated substance of concern does not meet 
residential standards, property may not be used for residential use in the future unless it 
undergoes further cleanup); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, §§ 742.4l5(c)-(d) (1996) (area 
background standard may not be used if it would pose acute health risk); Reiser, Brown-
field Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, supra note 100 (reporting lllinois' "area back-
ground" standards allow lesser cleanups in industrial areas as long as contamination does 
not pose an acute risk to workers on the site). 
103. See Tynberg, Sllpra note 96, at 476 ("Because there is a significant disparate 
correlation between industrial contamination and its occurrences in low-income minority 
communities, the most socially appropriate remedy may be to force cleanup of a site to 
background levels."). 
104. See 40 C.P.R. § 300.430(a)(I)(iii)(F) (1998) (when restoration of groundwater 
is not practicable, cleanup plan may use measures to prevent further migration of contami-
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2. Model State-Approved Generic Risk-Based Cleanup Standards 
Model state-approved generic risk-based cleanup standards set nu-
merical standards for acceptable cancer risk. 105 While numerical risk 
standards may appear to be precise, states vary widely with respect to the 
assumptions used to measure the risk. For example, Pennsylvania does 
not consider the impact of institutional controls, such as fencing and fu-
ture land use restrictions, in determining whether a developer has met 
statewide health standards, but does consider them after an initial cleanup 
to determine if the standards are maintained. 106 Other states establish 
separate statewide health standards for residential and nonresidential 
uses, allowing higher levels of contamination at commercial or industrial 
sites.107 A state may allow a greater risk level for nonresidential sites. 
Alternatively, a state may set the same risk level for all sites, but allow 
more contamination at an industrial site based on the assumption that 
human beings are much less likely to be exposed at such a site than a 
residential site. lOS These differential standards raise questions about 
nation); Jonathan S. Kannel, TItle 5 of New York's Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act 
Authorizes Risk Assessment to Clean up Brownfields, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 469, 477-78 
(1997). 
105. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 13-25-5-8.5(d)(I) (1998) (providing generic risk-based 
standards using statewide standards developed by state Department of Environmental Pro-
tection); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(1) (West 1998); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-
300-08 (1998) (generic numerical standards based upon intended use of property after 
voluntary cleanup); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303 (West 1999) (establishing cleanup 
requirements to meet statewide health standards under regulations adopted by state Envi-
ronmental Quality Board); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing Ohio's generic and 
property-specific risk assessment procedures); id. at 291-94 (discussing Pennsylvania's 
generic and property-specific risk assessment procedures); Kessler, supra note 94, at 188-
90 (discussing Pennsylvania's health-based standards). 
106. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(e)(3) (West 1999); Fairlie, supra note 
96, at 84 n.43. 
107. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k(a)(3) (1997) (Commissioner of Environ-
mental Protection may set more stringent cleanup standards for residential than historically 
industrial or commercial property); 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/58.5(d) (West 1998) (requiring 
one-in-a-million cancer risk for residential uses in "Tiers I and II;' but only one-in-ten-
thousand for commercial and industrial uses in "Tier III"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3746.04(B)(I) (West 1998); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-08(A)(2) (1998); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.305 (West 1999) (establishing less stringent cleanup standards for 
special industrial sites that have no financially viable responsible person to remediate them 
or are located in an "enterprise zone"); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing Ohio's 
generic and property-specific risk assessment standards for nonresidential and residential 
properties); id. at 291-96 (discussing Pennsylvania's generic and property-specific risk 
assessment standards for nonresidential and residential properties). But see WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 173-340-740(1), -745 (1997) (requiring presumption of residential cleanup stan-
dards unless site meets specific industrial use criteria). 
108. See Michael L. Gargas & Thomas F. Long, The Role of Risk Assessment in Re-
developing Brownfield Sites, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVEL-
OPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, at 214, 229-32, 242-45 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. 
Margolis eds., 1997) (discussing differences in human and ecological exposure assump-
tions for plausible future-use scenarios). 
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whether particular population groups living near commercial or industrial 
areas will be disproportionately impacted. 
3. Site-Specific Standards 
Site-specific standards are based upon an individualized risk as-
sessment that considers the future use of a property (i.e., commercial, 
industrial, or residential).I09 A site-specific plan may allow for limited 
treatment of contamination in conjunction with the use of institutional 
and engineering controls to contain any remaining contamination.110 An 
increasing number of cleanups are applying site-specific approaches, but 
the expense of conducting such a risk assessment may make that method 
inappropriate for some developers.1l1 
C. Do Future Use Provisions and Institutional Controls Lower Cleanup 
Standards and Raise Health Concerns? 
A controversial issue is whether EPA or states should consider the 
future use of a site, and allow lower cleanup standards if a site will be 
used for industrial or commercial uses rather than residential purposes. 
To guarantee long-term protection of public health and the environment, 
CERCLA explicitly prefers permanent treatment remedies that destroy 
hazardous chemicals rather than simply contain them with clay liners or 
other protective barriers.1l2 Additionally, in evaluating risks at Superfund 
109. See IND. CODE § 13-25-5-8.5(b)(2) (1998) (allowing site-specific, risk-based 
standard depending upon future use of the site); IOWA CODE § 455H.204 (1999) (providing 
site-specific cleanup standards); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. § 7-508(b)(2) (1998) (participant 
in voluntary cleanup may select cleanup standard based on site-specific risk assessment); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304 (West 1999) (state may approve voluntary cleanup 
based upon site-specific risk assessment); VA. CODE ANN. § 1O.1-1429.1(A)(I) (Michie 
1998) (state may issue regulations allowing voluntary cleanup based upon site-specific risk 
assessment); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 284 (discussing Ohio's site-specific standards); id. at 
293-94 (discussing Pennsylvania's site-specific standards); Sweeney, supra note 4, at 154-
55 (discussing Pennsylvania's site-specific standards); Koch, supra note 13, at 200-01 
(discussing Florida's site-specific standards); Kessler, supra note 94, at 190-94 (discussing 
Pennsylvania's site-specific standards). 
110. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) (West 1999) (site-specific response 
action may consist "solely of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions" only if 
such institutional controls would satisfy land use law applicable at time site was contami-
nated); Creenan & Lewis, supra note 96, at 684-85. 
111. See Abbi L. Cohen, Voluntary Remediation Programs, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, 
Apr. 2,1997, at 11. 
112. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(I) (1994); Lynn E. Blais, Environmental Racism Re-
considered, 75 N.C. L. REV. 75, 146 (1996); Susan C. Borinsky, The Use of Institutional 
Controls in Superfund and Similar State Laws, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8-10 (1995) 
(discussing EPA's preference for treatment over engineering and institutional controls); 
Powell, supra note 72, at 117; Rimer, supra note 61, at 90; Krista J. Ayers, Comment, The 
Potential for Future Use Analysis in Superfund Remediation Programs, 44 EMORY L.J. 
1503, 1503-05 (1995). 
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sites, EPA has usually employed a conservative, protective "reasonable 
maximum exposure" approach that assumes a site would be used for 
residential purposes and will be a significant source of drinking water 
even if it currently is used for industrial or commercial purposes.1I3 As a 
result, for many years EPA strongly preferred permanent treatment to 
residential levels instead of remedies that contained existing contamina-
tion to industrial or commercial safety levels by employing institutional 
and engineering controls, such as capping and fencing the site, posting 
signs, monitoring and limiting use of groundwater, deed restrictions, 
zoning requirements, or restrictive covenants or easements.1I4 EPA's Na-
tional Contingency Plan regulations for Superfund cleanups, however, 
recognize that permanent treatment may be impractical in some circum-
stances and therefore authorize engineering or institutional controls, such 
as containment, in appropriate cases.l15 Thus, EPA will consider a site's 
future use in determining the appropriate remedy under CERCLA.1I6 
Proponents of brownfield redevelopment argue that EPA and states 
should consider whether a site's future use is most likely to be industrial 
or commercial to avoid unnecessarily expensive c1eanups.117 Brownfield 
developers argue that residential exposure assumptions should be used 
only when residential use and the exposure of children is likely.1I8 As-
suming a site will be used for residential purposes rather than industrial 
uses may increase risk estimates by up to a thousand times. 1I9 Even if the 
113. See James H. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regllla-
tory Refomls for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 165 (1997) (EPA uses "reasonable 
maximum exposure" to assess risk of Superfund sites); Alex Karlin, How Long is Clean?: 
The Temporal Dimension to Protecting Human Health Under SlIperfllnd, 9 NAT. RE-
SOURCES & ENV'T 6, 47 (1994). 
114. See Rimer, sllpra note 61, at 90-92; Borinsky, sllpra note 112, at 8-10 (dis-
cussing EPA's preference for treatment over engineering and institutional controls). See 
generally 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(B)-(D), 300.430(e)(3)(i)-(ii) (1998) (referring to 
engineering and institutional controls); John Pendergrass, Use of Instillliional Comrols as 
Part of a SlIperfund Remedy: Lessons From Other Programs, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtI. L. 
Inst.) 10,109 (1996); infra notes 115-116, 129-131 and accompanying text. 
115. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(1)(iii)(B)-(D) (1998) (EPA may allow engineering 
controls such as containment where permanent treatment of hazardous contamination is 
impractical); id. § 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(C)-(G) (EPA must consider risks and costs of removal 
and treatment with risks and costs of less permanent cleanup approaches); Karmel, sllpra 
note 104, at 477. See generally Borinsky, sllpra note 112; Pendergrass, sllpra note 114, at 
10,109-10. 
116. See Memorandum from Elliott P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, to EPA Regional Directors, OSWER 
Directive No. 9355.7-04, Land Use in the CERCLA Remedy Selection Process (May 25, 
1995) (addressing consideration of future land use in remedy selection determinations 
under CERCLA); Land Use Directive, 60 Fed. Reg. 29,595 (1995) (same). 
117. See James H. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, Hllman Health Risk Assessments for 
SlIperfllnd, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 573, 587-88 (1994) [hereinafter Hamilton & Viscusi, Hllman 
Health Risk Assessment] (observing that EPA often assumes future residential use at Super-
fund site that has low probability of future residential use); Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92. 
118. See Gargas & Long, sllpra note 108, at 245. 
119. See id. at 244-45 (discussing case study of brownfield where cleanup to resi-
dential standards would have cost $55 million, but cleanup to industrial standards only 
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same risk levels are used at both residential and nonresidential sites (for 
example, a one-in-a-million maximum lifetime risk of contracting cancer 
from a chemical), a much higher level of contamination is usually al-
lowed at an industrial site because of the assumption that human beings 
are much less likely to be exposed at the industrial site.120 For instance, a 
realistic industrial future use scenario might assume that an adult worker 
may be exposed twelve hours a day, 250 days a year, for a maximum of 
thirty years. Additionally, a realistic industrial use scenario might assume 
limited surface-soil contact and exposure to dusts. By contrast, a resi-
dential model might set a much more restrictive exposure limit based on 
the greater vulnerability of children to substances such as lead and the 
likelihood that children may ingest soil. Furthermore, some commenta-
tors maintain that EPA should strongly consider the use of less expensive 
institutional and engineering controls such as land use restrictions or 
physical barriers that could limit human access to a site. 121 
Many environmentalists have raised concerns that government 
officials will allow developers to clean up sites under less stringent in-
dustrial standards, but then later approve residential development, or that 
contamination from an industrial site will migrate to residential areas.122 
While restrictive covenants or other land use restrictions should prevent 
sites designated for commercial or industrial use from being used for 
residential purposes, there are serious questions about who will actually 
enforce such provisions in the future. l23 Furthermore, even if these sites 
are only used for industrial and commercial purposes, is it fair to make 
some neighborhoods "sacrifice zones"?124 Because many brownfields are 
located in heavily minority, inner-city areas, proponents of environmental 
justice are concerned that such sacrifice zones will disproportionately 
affect minority groups.l25 Additionally, some environmentalists have 
$500,000); Land-Use Planning Can Reduce Cost of Cleanup at Superfund Sites: Study, 
HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, Sept. 22, 1997 (reporting that a study by Peter Katsumata and 
William Kastenberg found that assumption a site will be used for residential purposes 
rather than industrial uses may increase risk estimates by up to three orders of magnitude). 
120. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 229-32, 242-45. 
121. See Hamilton & Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments, supra note 117, at 
608-09 (arguing institutional or engineering controls could avoid many risks currently 
assumed to exist in EPA risk assessments of Superfund sites); John Pendergrass, Sustain-
able Redevelopment of Brownfields: Using Institutional Controls to Protect Public Health, 
29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,243-48 (1999) (discussing various types of institu-
tional controls and financing of these systems); Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92. 
122. See McWilliams, supra note 4, at 706-08; Powell, supra note 72, at 132-33; 
Sweeney, supra note 4, at 115-16; Wemstedt & Hersh, supra note 11, at 159-61; Rimer, 
supra note 61, at 93-94. 
123. See Borinsky, supra note 112, at 7; Pendergrass, supra note 121, 10,255; 
Rimer, supra note 61, at 99-100. 
124. Stacie A. Craddock, A Call for Public Participation in State Voluntary Reme-
diation Programs: Strategies for Promoting Public Involvement Opportunities in Virginia, 
30 U. RICH. L. REv. 499, 509 (1996). 
125. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 887, 1002-03 (arguing brownfield redevelopment 
"may perpetuate environmental inequities by increasing the high degree of risk that af-
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raised questions about whether industrial-use cleanups will really be less 
expensive or time-consuming if the remedies truly provide long-term 
protection of public health and the environment. Protecting workers from 
occupational exposure to soil risks, for instance, can be very expensive. 126 
There are also serious questions about whether existing land use and in-
stitutional controls will be effective because no agency has a clear over-
sight role to monitor their effectiveness.127 Institutional and engineering 
controls do not provide finality and, thus, require the government or a 
private entity to supervise the property to assure that contamination does 
not spread, especially to residential areas or sources of drinking water. 128 
EPA recently has become somewhat more willing to accept cleanups 
that do not meet permanent, residential cleanup standards.129 In 1995, 
EPA issued a guidance that allows the agency to consider the likely fu-
ture use of a site as long as the agency consults with a wide range of in-
terested parties about the site's likely use.130 As a result, EPA is more 
willing to consider remedies that include institutional and engineering 
controls rather than permanent treatment.131 
States have been far more aggressive than EPA in allowing consid-
eration of future use in setting cleanup standards for voluntary cleanups. 
Approximately forty-one states have enacted statutes or regulations that 
fected communities are already forced to bear"); Field, supra note 10, at 652; Poindexter, 
supra note 13, at 37-38; Swanston, supra note 13, at 568-72 (arguing reduced cleanup 
standards for brownfield projects will increase risks to poor and minority communities); 
but see Koch, supra note 13, at 215-20 (arguing environmental justice critique that 
brownfield redevelopment trades jobs for health of community is misplaced and that such 
redevelopment usually improves both economic needs and public health of surrounding 
communities). 
126. See Rimer, supra note 61, at 93-94. 
127. See Bradford C. Mank, Other Remedial Issues: Long-Term Monitoring, Re-
openers and Cost Underestimates, in 1 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP 
AND REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND § 25.01 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter, Mank, Other Remedial Issues] (long-term monitoring and maintenance of 
engineering controls under RCRA or CERCLA can be very expensive); Ponder Land Use, 
Institutional Controls When Reauthorizing Superfund: RFF, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, 
June 23, 1997 (reporting that a Resources for the Future report raised questions about ef-
fectiveness of land use and institutional controls at three National Priority List ("NPL") 
sites). But see Pendergrass, supra note 121, at 10,243-48 (discussing various types of in-
stitutional controls and financing of these systems). 
128. See Rimer, supra note 61, at 93-94. 
129. See Ayers, supra note 112, at 1506-07, 1513-18 (noting that EPA is expanding 
its consideration of future use in cleanup decisions despite CERCLA's preference for per-
manent cleanups); Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92 (same). 
130. See OmCE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE ("OSWER"), U.S. 
EPA, LAND USE IN THE CERCLA REMEDY SELECTION PROCESS, OSWER Directive No. 
9355.7-04 (May 25, 1995); Rimer, supra note 61, at 91-92; Lauri DeBrie Thanheiser, The 
Allure of a Lure: Proposed Federal Land Use Restriction Easements in Remediation of 
Contaminated Property, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 271, 287-88 (1997); Corrective 
Action for Releases from Solid Waste Units at Hazardous Waste Management Facilities, 61 
Fed. Reg. 19,432, 19,439, 19,452, 19,460 (1996). 
131. See Rimer, supra note 61, at 90-92; supra notes 115-116 and accompanying 
text. 
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authorize environmental agencies to consider the future use of a site 
when setting cleanup standards or approving a remedy at a specific site. 132 
These states allow higher levels of contamination if a site is likely to re-
main commercial or industrial for the foreseeable future. To guarantee 
that the future use remains industrial or commercial, states typically re-
quire the developer to impose land use restrictions and perhaps physical 
engineering controls to ensure that the area does not become residen-
tial. I33 
There is a middle ground between mandating permanent residential 
treatment in all cases and liberally allowing industrial-level cleanups 
whenever a developer seeks a less stringent cleanup. In some circum-
stances, it may be appropriate to use lower cleanup standards at certain 
industrial or commercial sites that are unlikely to be used for residential 
purposes in the future and pose no risk to surrounding populations. l34 
Considering a site's future use is appropriate as long as a remedy ade-
quately protects public health and the environment. 
Nevertheless, a cleanup that leaves a significant level of contamina-
tion poses risks because institutional or engineering controls can fail in 
132. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398(d)(1) (West 1999) (allowing 
remedy to be based on intended use of property); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-133k (1999) 
(remedy may consider future use if property was traditionally industrial or commercial 
property); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-734(f) (1999) (voluntary cleanup plan may address 
"current and reasonably anticipated future uses of the facility and immediately adjacent 
properties."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10B-12a, -12c(l) (West 1999) (allowing remedy to be 
based on intended use of property); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.04(B)(I), (2) (West 
1998) (allowing remedy to be based on intended use of property); OR. REv. STAT. 
§ 465.315(1)(g) (1997) (allowing consideration of "current and reasonably anticipated" 
future use); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(f) (1999) (site-specific remediation plan 
may consider future use of site); UTAH ADMIN. CODE § R315-101-5.2(b)(2) (1996) (al-
lowing future land use planning to be considered if potential land use is more protective 
than actual land use conditions); see BNA Superfund, supra note 6, at d8 (reporting that as 
of 1998 41 states consider future land use as a factor in determining cleanup standards); 
infra notes 12, 107-108, 133 and accompanying text. 
133. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6(b)(1) (West 1999) (allow-
ing state to approve engineering and land use controls); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-1330(b) 
(1999) (requiring binding land use restrictions if cleanup is below residential levels); 
MICH. COMPo LAWS § 324.20120b(2), (4) (1999) (requiring cleanups below residential 
standards to include notice to land records and restrictive covenants); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 58:10B-12g(3) (allowing state to approve engineering and institutional controls); N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0503(2)(g) (McKinney 1999) (allowing Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation to approve municipal restoration project that employs engineering 
and institutional controls); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.01(N), 3746.05 (West 1999) 
(allowing engineering and institutional controls for complying land uses); PA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 35, § 6026.304(i) (1999) (noting that site-specific response action may only consist 
"solely of fences, warning signs or future land use restrictions" if such institutional con-
trols would satisfy land use law applicable at time site was contaminated); Borinsky, supra 
note 112, at 24-25; Karmel, supra note 104, at 490. 
134. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 244-45 (discussing case study of 
brownfield where cleanup to residential standards would have cost $55 million, cleanup to 
industrial standards only $500,000, and industrial/commercial use scenario was far more 
realistic); Karmel, supra note 104, at 479-80. 
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the future. 135 Contamination from an industrial or commercial site may 
migrate to an aquifer or well used for drinking water. Accordingly, an 
agency should not allow a developer to rely on engineering or institu-
tional controls if there is a significant likelihood of off-site migration or 
human exposure.136 Owners or operators of a property that is limited to 
industrial or commercial use should be liable if the property is later used 
for purposes that affect residential neighbors. 137 If future scientific re-
search demonstrates a higher risk than was understood at the time of a 
cleanup agreement between a developer and a government agency, the 
owner should have a duty to eliminate contamination that poses substan-
tial risks to public health and the environment. 138 However, states should 
consider providing funding if unanticipated risks that could not have 
been expected at the time of the initial cleanup later develop at a site. 
D. Numerical Cleanup Standards: Do Relaxed Standards at Industrial or 
Commercial Sites Raise Concerns? 
States frequently rely on numerical cleanup standards to define ac-
ceptable risk, but these standards may fail to address the greater suscep-
tibility of some minority groups to risks that may be acceptable to the 
general population. These numerical cleanup standards also could pro-
duce disparate racial impacts because states often set a different, less 
protective standard for industrial and commercial sites that may be dis-
proportionately located near minority populations. 
Numerical risk standards usually try to define the lifetime risk of 
contracting cancer from a particular chemical, but they frequently fail to 
reflect scientific uncertainties or the possibility that different social, eth-
nic, or racial groups may be more or less susceptible to certain chemical 
exposures.139 Risk-based standards are usually established by estimating 
the lifetime risk that a hypothetical person will develop cancer as a result 
of being subject to the reasonable maximum exposure of the facility's 
chemicals from living close to the site for thirty or seventy years.140 There 
135. See Karmel, supra note 104, at 492. 
136. See Ayers, supra note 112, at 1507-08. 
137. See Mank, Other Remedial Issues, supra note 127, § 25.02[4][c] n.76; Ayers, 
supra note 112, at 1508-09. 
138. See Mank, Other Remedial Issues, supra note 127, § 25.03[2] (observing that 
government regulation may become more stringent, especially as technology develops and 
future scientific discoveries may reveal risks that are unknown today); Rimer, supra note 
61, at 97 (stating that future scientific discoveries may reveal risks that are unknown to-
day); Ayers, supra note 112, at 1509-10 (arguing that government regulation may become 
more stringent, especially as technology develops). 
139. See infra notes 139-143, 165-167. 
140. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 230-31; Hamilton & Viscusi, Human 
Health Risk Assessments, supra note 117, at 579 n.33; Bradford C. Mank, What Comes 
After Technology: Using an "Exceptions Process" to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of 
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has been considerable controversy about the assumptions used in such 
estimates, including whether the hypothetical person used in these type 
of estimates accurately reflects how long or how close real people typi-
cally live near such sites.141 Furthermore, estimates based on the "aver-
age" person, typically a white man, may not reflect gender differences or 
the different dietary or lifestyle patterns of various minority subpopula-
tions.142 These differences are discussed in detail in Part IV, Section A, 
below. Because residents of low-income and minority communities often 
have poorer health than the general population, the Institute of Medicine, 
which is affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences, has recom-
mended that policymakers should presume that those residents may be 
more susceptible than others to environmental hazards.143 Thus, even if a 
chemical is safe for the majority of the population, it may disproportion-
ately affect certain minority groups. Yet EPA's risk assessment proce-
dures do not adequately address this problem. l44 
Federal environmental statutes and regulations vary somewhat in the 
level of risk they allow. For its Superfund risk assessments, EPA requires 
risks to an individual subject to a "reasonable maximum exposure," such 
as living near a facility for thirty years, to be reduced to within or below 
the range of a one-in-ten-thousand to a one-in-one-million lifetime can-
cer risk.145 EPA considers a cancer risk of one-in-one-million to be the 
most conservative, protective approach to protecting health that is feasi-
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 263, 281-83, 332 (1994) [hereinafter, 
Mank, What Comes After Technology]. 
141. See Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 312, 336-37 
(looking at maximally exposed individual near a factory rather than a hypothetical maxi-
mally exposed individual can reduce estimated exposures by a factor of 100 at some 
sources); see also John S. Applegate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental 
Justice: Evaluating the Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243, 
265-70 (1997-98) (arguing that risk assessment often inflates risk through overly conser-
vative assumptions); Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Riskfrom Expo-
sure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 34~ (1992) (critiquing current risk 
assessment techniques used by EPA). 
142. See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative 
Risk Assessmellt, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 121-23; Mank, What Comes After Technology, 
supra note 140, at 336. 
143. See Environmental J/lStice: Policymakers Urged to Focus on Health When Data 
Are Lacking, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2231 (Mar. 12, 1999). 
144. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 117-23, 151-53; Mank, What Comes After 
Technology, supra note 140, at 336. 
145. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan, 40 C.ER. 
§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1998) ("For known or suspected carcinogens, acceptable expo-
sure levels are generally concentration levels that represent an excess up~er bound lifetime 
cancer risk to an individual of between 10-4 [one in ten thousand] to 10 [one in one mil-
lion] ... "); OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, ROLE OF THE 
BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE SUPERFUND REMEDY SELECTION DECISIONS, OSWER 
Directive No. 9355.0-30 (1991); BARTSCH & COLLATON, supra note 4, at 10 (EPA uses risk 
range of one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-one-miIlion excess cancer deaths for Superfund 
cleanups); Hamilton & Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Super-
fimd, supra note 113, at 167; Hamilton & Viscusi, Human Health Risk Assessments, supra 
note 117, at 579-80, 583 n.66; Karlin, supra note 113, at 7. 
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ble in a modern, industrial society.146 To put this standard into perspec-
tive, there is a one-in-one-million chance that a person will die from 
smoking two cigarettes. 147 
States have adopted different numeric cleanup standards. To protect 
human health, some states require a maximum risk of one-in-one-million 
for all types of sites.148 Statutes requiring uniform standards for all types 
of brownfield sites are less likely to cause disparate impacts against 
groups that are more likely to live near industrial or commercial sites.149 
However, developers have complained that a uniform standard requiring 
a maximum lifetime cancer risk of one-in-one-million is too restrictive 
and prevents redevelopment of many brownfield sites. ISO Some states re-
quire a one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk standard for individual 
carcinogens,1SI but allow a one-in-one-hundred-thousandls2 or even one-
in-ten-thousandI53 risk if multiple carcinogens or exposure pathways are 
present at a site. Other states establish a one-in-one-million or one-in-
one-hundred-thousand maximum risk for carcinogens at residential sites, 
146. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.430(e)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1998) ("The 1006 [one in one million] risk level shall be used as 
the point of departure for determining remediation goals for alternatives when ARARs are 
not available or are not sufficiently protective because of the presence of multiple contami-
nants at a site or multiple pathways of exposure."). 
147. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 5-6 (1993). 
148. See FLA. STAT. § 376.81(1), (g)(I) (1997) (requiring one-in-one-million life-
time cancer risk for groundwater cleanups); id. § 376.81(1)(j)(1) (requiring one-in-one-
million lifetime cancer risk for soil cleanups); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:lDB-12(d)(l) (West 
1999) (soil remediation health risk standards requiring one-in-one-million lifetime cancer 
risk for both residential and nonresidential uses from any particular contaminant and not 
from cumulative effects of more than one contaminant). 
149. See generally John Graham et aI., Who Lives Near Coke Plants and Oil 
Refineries?: An Exploration of the Environmental Eqllity Hypothesis, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 
171, 183 (1999) (minorities and low-income populations are more likely to live near coke 
plants and oil refineries). 
150. See Evan Perez, Lawmakers to Re-Examine Brownfield Clean-Up Rilles, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998, at Fl (finding minorities are more likely to live in industrial and 
commercial areas). 
151. See OR. REv. STAT. 465.315(1)(b)(A) (1997) (requiring one-in-one-million 
cancer risk for individual carcinogens); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-340-700(3)(b),(c) 
(1997) (requiring one-in-one-million cancer risk for individual carcinogens, but one-in-
one-hundred-thousand risk for multiple carcinogens or exposure pathways); WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE § 720.19(5)(1), (2) (1997) (requiring one-in-one-million cancer risk from soil con-
tact for individual carcinogens, but one-in-one-hundred-thousand risk for cumulative expo-
sure). 
152. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 324.20120a(4) (West 1999) (requiring one-in-
one-hundred-thousand maximum cancer risk); OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-122-045(3) (1997) 
(requiring one-in-one-million lifetime cancer risk for individual carcinogens, but allowing 
one-in-one-hundred-thousand risk if there are more than ten carcinogens); WASH. ADMIN. 
CODE § 173-340-700(3)(b),(c) (1997); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 720.19(5)(1), (2) (1997); Tyn-
berg, sllpra note 96, at 477-78 (discussing risk levels in Oregon's statute and administra-
tive regulations). 
153. See 9 Va. Regs. Reg. 20-160-90(C)(I)(a) (requiring one-in-one-million cancer 
risk for individual carcinogens, but one-in-ten-thousand risk for multiple carcinogens or 
exposure pathways). 
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but allow a one-in-ten-thousand risk for industrial uses.154 By using lower 
numerical standards for industrial or commercial sources, states use 
quantitative risk assessment methodology to implement the future use 
strategies discussed in Section C that contemplate lower levels of human 
exposure in such areas. 
Still other states set a cancer risk range between one-in-one-million 
and one-in-ten-thousand lifetime risk for all types of sites.155 Statutes that 
allow a one-in-ten-thousand cancer risk in some circumstances may 
cause disproportionate risks to low-income and minority groups because 
they are more likely to live near industrial and commercial areas that dis-
proportionately contain brownfield sites.156 Furthermore, redevelopment 
of such sites may pose risks in the future if subsequent users of a site fail 
to maintain institutional or engineering controls. There is also a risk that 
a commercial or industrial neighborhood may become residential in the 
future and, thus, a plan that is protective now may become inadequate in 
the future. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND BROWNFIELDS 
A. Environmental Justice: Minorities Are More Likely to Live Near 
Multiple Sources of Pollution and May Be More Susceptible to 
Certain Chemicals 
The environmental justice movement has grown into a major politi-
cal movement because a number of studies have found that minority 
groups and low-income people are more likely to live near sources of 
154. See 415 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/58.5(d) (West 1998) (requiring one-in-one-million 
cancer risk for residential uses, but allowing risk range of one in ten thousand to one in one 
million for commercial and industrial uses); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-
09(C)(1)(a),(b)(i) (1998) (providing for risk level of one in one hundred thousand for resi-
dential and commercial and one in ten thousand for industrial uses); BARTSCH & COLLA-
TON, supra note 4, at 60 (discussing Illinois' consideration of future use to determine 
cleanup levels, requiring one-in-one-million cancer risk for residential uses in "Tiers I and 
II," but only one-in-ten-thousand for commercial and industrial uses in "Tier ill"); 
Sweeney, supra note 4, at 126 n.147 (discussing Ohio's site-specific standards). 
155. See ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE RI8-7-201(27) (1998) (setting risk range between one 
in ten thousand and one in one million excess cancer risk for nonresidential uses); id. R18-
7-201(35) (setting risk range between one in ten thousand and one in one million excess 
cancer risk for residential uses); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.303(c)(I) (West 1999) 
(setting risk range between one in ten thousand and one in one million excess cancer risk 
as statewide health standard); id. § 6026.304(b) (setting risk range between one in ten 
thousand and one in one million excess cancer risk for site-specific cleanups); UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE § R315-101-6(c)(I)-(3),(d)-(e) (1996) (if risk is less than one in one mil-
lion, no action required; if risk is between one in one million and one in ten thousand, 
some corrective action or containment measures required). 
156. See Arnold, supra note 23, at 80-89; see also Rabin, supra note 23, at 101-20; 
supra notes 23, 125 and accompanying text. 
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harmful pollutants.157 Furthermore, cities are more likely to locate indus-
trial or commercial zoning in low-income, high-minority census tracts 
than in high-income, low-minority areas.15S Several studies have found 
that racial minority and low-income groups disproportionately live near 
hazardous waste treatment or disposal facilities. 159 
Minorities, especially African American and Hispanic farm work-
ers, are far more likely to be exposed to and to die from pesticide-related 
illnesses.16O Urban African American children under the age of five have 
substantially higher lead levels in their blood than white children of 
similar age groups living in the same cities.161 Certain minority groups 
are disproportionately likely to consume fatty fish that concentrate toxins 
in their fat tissues.162 
However, other studies have failed to find that minority groups dis-
proportionately live near hazardous waste storage facilities. 163 One highly 
sophisticated study sponsored by EPA found statistically significant dis-
crimination against Hispanics in the location of such facilities, but not 
against African Americans or poor communities. l64 There is also dis-
157. See John A. Hird & Michael Reese, The Distriblltion of Environmental Quality: 
An Empirical Analysis, 79 Soc. SCI. Q. 693, 707-11 (199S) (finding that "[e]ven when 
numerous other potentially relevant variables are included in the analysis, race and ethnic-
ity remain strongly associated with environmental quality, with both nonwhite and His-
panic populations experiencing disproportionately high pollution levels" but not finding 
that low income levels are associated with higher levels of pollution); Bradford C. Mank, 
Environmental Justice, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, at 12B-7 (Michael 
Gerrard ed., 1999) (summarizing several studies finding low-income and minority popula-
tions are disproportionately exposed to various types of pollutants). 
15S. See Arnold, supra note 23, at SO-S9; see also Rabin, supra note 23, at 101-20; 
supra notes 23, 125, 156 and accompanying text. 
159. See Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-7 (summarizing sev-
eral studies finding evidence of environmental discrimination). 
160. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at lIS. 
161. See I ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, 
AND EVALUATION, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COM-
MUNITIES, WORKGROUP REpORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR 11, 11-12 (June 1992) [herein-
after EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT]; FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 7S-S0 (ac-
knowledging substantial evidence that minority children are exposed to higher levels of 
lead than white children, but arguing that evidence of health impacts from those higher 
levels remains uncertain); Field, supra note 10, at 642 (16% of all children in United States 
have elevated blood lead levels, but the rate is close to 70% for inner-city African Ameri-
can children); Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under TItle VI of the 
Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 2S5, 299 (1995); Kuehn, supra note 142, at lIS. 
162. See U.S. EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 161, at 15-16; 
Kuehn, supra note 142, at lIS; Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-7. 
163. See generally FOREMAN, supra note IS, at IS-27 (summarizing conflicting 
studies about whether hazardous waste sites are disproportionately located in minority 
population areas and arguing that there is only weak evidence of disproportionate siting or 
exposure); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-S (summarizing several 
studies finding no evidence of environmental discrimination). 
164. See Vicki Been & Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Bar-
rios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 9, 
19-27, 33-34 (1997) (using 1990 census data, examining 544 communities that hosted 
active commercial hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities and finding no 
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agreement over whether EPA and state agencies enforce environmental 
laws equally in white and minority areas.165 
There is some evidence that minority groups are disproportionately 
exposed to multiple sources of pollution. 166 For instance, some studies 
suggest that particular minority groups are more likely to live near Super-
fund sites, and, as a result, are more likely to be exposed to multiple 
chemicals.167 Furthermore, the disproportionate exposure of minorities to 
multiple sources of pollution may be especially harmful because certain 
minority groups have dietary or lifestyle patterns that make them likely 
to consume foods that are disproportionately contaminated with harmful 
pollutants, are in poorer health than the general population, or have jobs 
that disproportionately expose them to contact with soil or groundwater 
containing harmful pollutants.168 
Although more research is needed both about the synergistic effects 
of various pollutants and about their impact on different subpopulation 
groups,169 some studies suggest that combinations of two or three chemi-
cals can dramatically increase their effects a thousandfold or more. Yet 
current environmental statutes and regulations usually fail to address 
such multiple and cumulative exposures because they typically govern 
only one medium (Le., air, water, or land).170 Additionally, EPA has tra-
ditionally avoided questions of cumulative or synergistic impacts because 
data about such impacts is lacking or more difficult and costly to de-
velop.171 EPA has slowly begun to conduct more research about the im-
pacts of pollution on minority and low-income groups. In 1992, EPA's 
Environmental Equity Work Group issued the agency's first major report 
substantial evidence that commercial hazardous waste facilities that began operating be-
tween 1970 and 1990 were sited in areas that were disproportionately African American or 
Hispanic, but did find evidence that such facilities were disproportionately located in areas 
of poverty). 
165. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 
21, 1992, at S2; Richard J. Lazarus, Essay, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 
705, 713 (1997); Mank, Environmelltal Justice, supra note 157, at 12B-7. But see FORE-
MAN, supra note 15, at 23-27 (arguing studies showing disproportionate enforcement of 
environmental laws harming minority groups are seriously flawed). 
166. See Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in En-
vironmental Decisions: Communities Speaking for Themselves, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 
37,55-57 (1998); Hird & Reese, supra note 157, at 709-10. 
167. See Hamilton & Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory Reforms for Su-
peifund, supra note 113, at 180. 
168. See Lazarus, supra note 165, at 712-13. But see Vicki Ferstel, Scholar Urges 
More Debate, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Jan. 6, 1999, at lB-2B (reporting that Christo-
pher H. Foreman, Jr., senior fellow at Brookings Institution, argues there is no proof dif-
ferent pollutants interact to create multiple, cumulative and synergistic risk). 
169. See Collin & Collin, supra note 166, at 55-56. 
170. See Lazarus, supra note 165, at 712-13; Bradford C. Mank, The Environmelltal 
Protection Agency's Project XL and Other Regulatory Reform Initiatives: The Need for 
Legislative Authorization, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 6 (1998). 
171. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 117-23, 151-53; see also Lazarus, supra note 
165, at 712-13. But see Ferstel, supra note 168, at lB-2B. 
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on environmental justice issues,172 and the agency created the Office of 
Environmental Equity (now the Office of Environmental Justice) to in-
vestigate this problem.173 On February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12,898.174 Section 3-3 of this Order mandates all federal 
agencies to collect data about the health and environmental impact of 
their actions on minority groups and low-income populations, and to de-
velop policies to avoid adverse impacts on these groups.175 The Order 
also requires federal agencies to develop environmental justice strate-
gies l76 and achieve environmental justice goals "[t]o the greatest extent 
practicable and permitted by law."177 In its 1994 Environmental Justice 
Strategy, EPA pledged to increase its research of disproportionate, cu-
mulative, and synergistic impacts on minority groups.178 
Furthermore, EPA has finally begun to take into account exposure to 
multiple sources of pollution.179 However, the complexity of measuring 
cumulative and synergistic impacts has caused serious problems for the 
agency.180 EPA is working on a guidance document for assessing the 
health effects of mixed chemicals, but it is not known when the agency 
will actually issue the guidance. 181 Because brownfields may include 
172. See EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, sllpra note 162, at 2. 
173. See James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: PlIrslling Environmelllal 
JlIstice Throllgh Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 185-86 
(1994). 
174. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 18 C.F.R. § 380, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 
(1994); Bradford C. Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 103 (Mi-
chael Gerrard ed., forthcoming 1999). 
175. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, sllpra note 174, at § 3-301; Department of Trans-
portation Order to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,377 (1997); Major Willie A. Gunn, From the La/ldfill 
to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing Empowerment Strategies to Alleviate E1Ivir01l-
mental Injllstice, 22 OHIO N.U.L.REV. 1227, 1252-56 (1996); Mank, Execlltive Order 
12,898, sllpra note 174, at 106. 
176. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, sllpra note 174, at § 1-103(e); Land Use Direc-
tive, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,781 (1995); Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, sllpra note 174, at lOS, 
107-23 (discussing the environmental justice strategies of several agencies). 
177. Exec. Order No. 12,898, sllpra note 174, at § 1-101. 
178. See Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, sllpra note 174, at 109-14. 
179. See Memorandum from Carol Browner, Administrator of U.S. EPA, to Assis-
tant Administrators et aI., Cumulative Risk Assessment Guidance-Phase I Planning and 
Scoping (July 3, 1997) (Guidance requires all EPA offices to consider impacts from multi-
ple sources of chemicals "in all cases for which relevant data are available"); REPORT OF 
THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, sllpra note 3, at 21 (EPA is conducting research on 
the cumulative risk of air toxins and helping states to assess cumulative risk in setting total 
maximum daily loads under the Clean Water Act). 
180. Compare Ferstel, sllpra note 168, at lB-2B (reporting that Christopher H. 
Foreman, Jr., senior fellow at Brookings Institution, argues there is no proof different pol-
lutants interact to create multiple, cumulative and synergistic risk), with Kuehn, sllpra note 
142, at 103, 117-23, 151-53 (arguing EPA should devote more resources to cumulative 
and multiple risk assessments). 
181. See Sara Thurin Rollin, Agency Gllidance on Chemical Mixlllres will be 'Cor-
nerstone' of ClImlllative Risk, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 218, 218-19 (June 4, 1999); Sara 
Thurin Rollin, Mixtllres Docllment Reflects Merger of Agency Views on Cancer, NO/lca/lcer 
Risk, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 220, 220-21 (June 4, 1999). 
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multiple chemicals and pose substantial risks, states need to revise their 
risk assessment policies to address such risks. 
B. Environmental Justice and Brownfields Redevelopment: 
Conflicting or Complementary Goals? 
There is a serious question about whether brownfield projects to re-
use abandoned industrial properties will benefit the community at large 
or expose the community to greater health risks. Such programs often 
provide for expedited approval of permits and lower cleanup standards as 
incentives for encouraging redevelopment in economically depressed 
areas. IS2 Minority communities are often divided about whether the eco-
nomic benefits of brownfield redevelopment outweigh the health riskS.IS3 
Environmental justice advocates worry that many brownfield proj-
ects will pose serious health risks because EPA or states will lower 
cleanup standards in an effort to attract industry.l84 Because urban 
brownfields are often located in high population areas, some argue that 
cleanup standards should be higher for these projects rather than lower. ISS 
Furthermore, environmental justice advocates are concerned about 
whether low-income and minority groups actually receive significant new 
jobs, tax revenues, or general economic benefits from most brownfield 
projects.186 In reality, these projects often provide only a few jobs for lo-
cal residents, who may lack the necessary job skills or may be the vic-
tims of discrimination. l87 The greatest benefits of new facilities in low-
income and minority areas often go to skilled workers who live in sur-
rounding areas or to middle-class property owners who do not live close 
182. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and 
the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 54-57 (1998); KibeI, supra note 1, at 605-
09; Wernstedt & Hersh, supra note 11, at 159-60; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 706-07. 
183. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 47. 
184. See KibeI, supra note 1, at 607-09; Julia Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and 
the Role of SupeTjund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 
BUFF. L. REv. 285, 308-11 (1995); Swanston, supra note 13, 568-72; Wernstedt & Hersh, 
sllpra note 11, at 161. 
185. See Swanston, supra note 13, 568-72; Julia A. Solo, supra note 184, at 308-
11. 
186. See KibeI, supra note 1, at 607-09 (reporting proponents of environmental jus-
tice are concerned that brownfields redevelopment projects will increase health risks with-
out providing many jobs in minority communities). But see Lynn E. Blais, Environmental 
Racism Reconsidered, 75 N.C. L. REv. 75, 82-83, 105-08 (1996) (arguing environmental 
justice policies may discourage economic development); Stephen C. Jones & Annop G. 
Shroff, Balancing Growth and the Environment: Environmental Justice Concerns Delay 
I1Idustriai Expa1lsion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY, 1 (Oct. 1997) (same). 
187. See KibeI, supra note 1, at 607-09; Kuehn, supra note 142, at 162; McWil-
liams, supra note 4, at 707; see also FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 97-99 (arguing 
brownfields redevelopment projects often create a significant number of jobs, but acknowl-
edging more evidence is needed regarding long-term employment impacts, and noting it is 
more difficult to create jobs for disadvantaged individuals lacking job skills). 
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to the facility. ISS For instance, in Louisiana's St. James Parish, near the 
town of Covent, which environmentalists have dubbed "Cancer Alley," 
there is a high minority unemployment rate despite the presence of 
twelve petrochemical, fertilizer, or other plants emitting 24 million 
pounds of toxins a year.189 Even if a community negotiates a compensa-
tion package, which may include money, park land, emergency equip-
ment, or specific job guarantees, from a developer, the benefits do not 
necessarily go to those residents who suffer the greatest risk from a proj-
ect. 190 The tax proceeds usually go to the community at large rather than 
to the most immediate neighbors of a facility.191 
Environmental justice advocates also have moral concerns about 
brownfields redevelopment. Some environmental justice advocates be-
lieve that the entire brownfields agenda stems from a conscious or uncon-
scious desire to keep high-income, suburban areas clean at the expense of 
low-income and minority groups.l92 Finally, advocates often believe that 
some developers are "bad actors" who will not keep their promises and 
that state (and sometimes federal) regulators often fail properly to over-
see voluntary cleanup programs. 193 
In contrast, brownfield advocates argue that the economic benefits 
of brownfield projects far outweigh any risks, which proponents claim 
environmentalists frequently exaggerate.194 Brownfield projects can bring 
significant economic benefits to low-income and minority groups who 
suffer from poverty and high unemployment.195 Furthermore, because 
unemployment and poverty can lead to health problems from inadequate 
nutrition and limited access to health care,196 the economic benefits of 
188. See Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Sitillg: Risk-
Based Represelltatioll and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 410-24 (1995) 
[hereinafter, Mank, Environmetal Justice and Discriminatory Siting]; Wernstedt & Hersh, 
supra note 11, at 170-71. 
189. See Alexander Cockburn, Case Tests Clinton's Demand for "Environmental 
Justice," ARIz. REpUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1997, at B7 (discussing opposition to siting Shintech 
chemical plant in St. James Parish, Louisiana); Marcia Coyle, Governor v. SllIdents in 
$700M Plant Case, NAT. L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, at AI, A26-A27 (same); Deborah Mathis, 
Environmental Hazards Make Small Town Hellish Place to Live, Gannett News Service, 
June 1, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Allnews database. 
190. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 
357-68. 
191. See id. at 401-19. 
192. See Swanston, supra note 13, at 571-72. But cf. McWilliams, supra note 4, at 
717-22 (avoiding brownfields redevelopment will likely spread industrial pollution to 
greenfields ). 
193. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1024-25. 
194. See CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS LAMBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? 
6, 12-13 (1994); Nelson Smith & David Graham, Brownfields, Environmental Justice, alld 
Underlying Societal Problems, LEGAL TIMES, reprinted in 2 BROWNFIELD REpORT, No.17, 
Sept. 4, 1997. 
195. See David Friedman, The "Environmental Racism" Hoax, 9 AM. ENTERPRISE 
75 (Nov. 1, 1998). 
196. See BREYER, supra note 147, at 16-29; Frank B. Cross, When Environmental 
Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729, 730-40 
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brownfield projects may provide health benefits to an economically de-
pressed community that outweigh any health risks from the project.197 
Thus, some proponents of brownfield projects believe that environmental 
justice advocates often harm minority and low-income communities by 
blocking projects that address real economic problems because of their 
obsession with remote riskS.198 Moreover, voluntary action programs 
promoting brownfield redevelopment can actually benefit the environ-
ment if they result in faster, but still safe, cleanups. 
V. TITLE VI 
Under Title VI, federal agencies and departments may not provide 
funding to programs that discriminate on the basis of race.199 If any pro-
gram of a state or local government agency receives any federal assis-
tance, Title VI governs the entire agency.200 
Since 1993, the Clinton Administration has enforced Title VI far 
more aggressively than previous administrations.201 On February 11, 
1994, President Clinton issued a presidential directive on environmental 
justice, accompanied by Executive Order 12,898, that requires agencies 
to use their existing legal authority to achieve the environmental justice 
goals in the Order.202 In particular, the directive mandates that federal 
agencies providing funding to recipients with programs affecting human 
health or the environment confirm that their grant recipients comply with 
Title VP03 In 1994, EPA created an Office of Civil Rights to handle Title 
(1995). See generally Friedman, supra note 195 (reporting that a 1991 study by University 
of Pittsburgh physicist Bernard L. Cohen found that while hazardous waste and air pollu-
tion exposure reduces life expectancy by 3 to 40 days, poverty reduces life span by an 
average of 10 years). 
197. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 
397. 
198. See BOERNER & LAMBERT, supra note 194, at 12-13; Smith & Graham, supra 
note 194. 
199. Section 601 of the statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, 
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 
§§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 241, 252-53 (1964) codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1988); see Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 23-25. 
200. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 28. Title VI applies where federal funding 
is given to an intermediary non-federal entity that distributes this funding to ultimate 
beneficiaries, but does not apply to federal programs such as Social Security that pay 
benefits directly to individual beneficiaries. See Colopy, supra note 173, at 154. 
201. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 26-27; Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Pri-
vate Right of Action Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 18-20 
(1999) [hereinafter Mank, Private Right of Action]. 
202. See Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12898, 30 
WKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 279, 280 (1994); Mank, Executive Order 12,898, supra note 174, 
at 103,107. 
203. See Presidential Memorandum Accompanying Executive Order 12898, 30 
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VI issues.204 Between September 1993 and July 1998, fifty-eight envi-
ronmental justice complaints were filed with the agency, including fifty 
challenging state or local permit decisions/os about half of which are still 
pending.206 
A. Title VI: Sections 601 and 602 
Title VI contains two major sections. Section 601 of Title VI pro-
hibits federal grant recipients from engaging in discrimination.207 Section 
602 requires every federal agency or department to promulgate regula-
tions that specify how the agency will determine whether grant applicants 
or recipients are engaging in racially discriminatory practices, and to 
provide a process for investigating and reviewing complaints of racial 
discrimination filed with the agency.208 Since Congress enacted Title VI 
in 1964, all federal agencies have adopted Title VI regulations prohibit-
ing disparate-impact discrimination.209 In Guardians Association v. Civil 
Service Commission, a deeply divided Supreme Court ruled that Section 
601 of Title VI requires proof of intentional discrimination, but that fed-
eral grant agencies may promulgate regulations under Section 602 pro-
hibiting recipient state or local agencies from engaging in practices re-
sulting in discriminatory effects.210 
Because it addresses disparate impact discrimination, not just inten-
tional discrimination, Section 602 has had a far greater impact on regu-
lating recipient behavior than Section 60J.21I Under Section 602, a citizen 
Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 279, 280 (1994); Mank, Execlltive Order 12,898, supra note 
174, at 103, 107. 
204. See Natalie M. Hammer, Comment, Title VI as a Means of Achieving Environ-
mental Justice, 16 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 693,711 (1996); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 26. 
205. See Paul Connolly, Environmental Justice: Mayors RAP EPA at Meeting with 
Browner for Failure to Consult on Interim Guidance, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 658 (July 24, 
1998); Mank, Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 18. 
206. See Patrick Merkel, Civil Rights and the Environment: EPA, States Creating 
Another Regulatory Burden, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL-GREATER NEW YORK 
METRO EDITION, Mar. 1999. 
207. "No Person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). 
208. See id. § 2000d-1 (1994); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 25; Mank, Private 
Right of Action, supra note 201, at 12-13. 
209. See Sidney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Dis-
crimination-It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 939, 947-48 (1990) (discuss-
ing how task force helped agencies develop similar disparate impact regulations under 
Title VI); Mank, Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 14-16. 
210. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). See also Mank, 
Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 13-15. 
211. See Mank, Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 12-16. 
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may file an administrative complaint with EPA.212 However, it is unclear 
whether Section 602 allows a private right of action in federal court.213 
B. Burden of Proof under Title VI 
To succeed in a disparate impact claim, a Title VI plaintiff must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that a recipient agency 
has engaged in a practice that has a disproportionate impact on persons 
protected by the statute.214 Further, the plaintiff must show that the 
identified practice is the cause in fact of the alleged discrimination.2ls To 
establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must present evidence that a 
specific minority group experienced disproportionate impacts compared 
to a relevant comparison group and then persuade a court to infer that the 
recipient's practices caused those disproportionate impacts.216 For in-
stance, a Title VI plaintiff challenging the location of a highway or hos-
pital might compare the racial demographics of the site with appropriate 
alternative sites.217 
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burdens of pro-
duction and persuasion shift to the defendant. The defendant must there-
fore either disprove the validity of the plaintiff's prima facie case or 
affirmatively demonstrate "evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its action."218 In other words, the defendant must show a le-
gitimate reason of business or educational necessity for the actions 
causing a disparate impact. Even though EPA's Title VI regulations ap-
pear to prohibit any discriminatory effects, courts have generally inter-
preted Title VI implementing regulations to prohibit unjustified disparate 
impacts.219 Title VI cases suggest that defendants may be able to justify 
212. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 27-29; Bradford C. Mank, Environmental 
Justice and Title VI, 73 TuL. L. REv. 787, 795-98 (1999). 
213. See Mank, Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 3-6, 37-6l. 
214. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 799-800; see 
also EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 600-02 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(discussing standard for prima facie case under Title Vll). 
215. See 48 F.3d at 600-02. 
216. See, e.g., Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (discussing standard under Title VI for proving causation); Mank, Environ-
mental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 799-80l. 
217. See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 
110, 127-28 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (comparing racial demographics of highway site with other 
alternatives); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 800-Ol. 
218. United States v. Lulac, 793 F.2d 636, 649 (5th Cir. 1986) (determining that in 
Title VI cases, defendant has burden of production in showing business or educational 
necessity); NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1333-34 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
(finding same); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 801-02. 
219. See NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d at 1334 (stating "the challenged prac-
tice must not only affect disproportionately, it must do so unnecessarily"); Concerned 
Citizens, 608 F. Supp. at 127 ("[d]efendants are not per se prohibited from locating a 
highway where it will have differential impacts upon minorities. Rather, Title VI prohibits 
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disparate impacts through safety or efficiency justifications, significant cost 
savings, or the unavailability of physically suitable alternative sites.22o If the 
defendant meets its burden of production and persuasion, the ultimate 
burden of persuasion shifts back to the plaintiff, who then must prove 
either that the defendant's justification is a pretext for discrimination or 
that the defendant failed to adopt a less discriminatory alternative prac-
tice or location.221 
C. EPA's Regulations 
EPA currently provides funding to all state environmental agencies 
as well as to virtually all state or regional siting and permitting agen-
cies.222 Therefore, almost all state permit decisions are potentially subject 
to Title VI,223 Further, state environmental agencies usually administer 
state voluntary cleanup programs, so these programs are also likely to be 
subject to Title VI. 
EPA has promulgated regulations under Section 602 of Title VI that 
prohibit recipient agencies from engaging in practices creating discrimi-
natory effects or from locating a facility where it will have discrimina-
tory effects, including state agencies granting environmental permits.224 
EPA's Title VI regulations state: "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not 
use criteria or methods of administering its program which have the ef-
fect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, 
color, [or] national origin."22S Furthermore, these regulations mandate that 
state recipients maintain Title VI compliance programs addressing both 
discrimination by the state and any beneficiaries of state-administered 
funds.226 
EPA's mechanism for filing a Title VI complaint is relatively simple. 
First, a complainant must file a statement alleging that a federal funds 
recipient engages in discriminatory practices.227 Within twenty days of 
taking actions with differential impacts without adequate justification"); Mank, Environ-
mental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 807. 
220. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1413 (holding that lack of land for expansion at only 
proposed alternative site is adequate justification); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title 
VI, supra note 212, at 806-07. 
221. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra 
note 212, at 808. 
222. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 25. 
223. See id. 
224. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1998) (prohibiting use of discriminatory program cri-
teria); id. § 7.35(c) (prohibiting location of facility that has discriminatory effect); Mank, 
Title VI, supra note 16, at 25-26. 
225. 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b). See also 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (prohibiting location of facil-
ity that has discriminatory effect). 
226. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.410 (1998). 
227. The complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory ac-
tion, but complainants can request waiver of this time limit for good cause. See 40 C.F.R. 
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receiving a complaint, EPA conducts a preliminary investigation to de-
termine whether the complaint states a valid claim of discrimination and 
is within the agency's jurisdiction.228 If EPA accepts the complaint for inves-
tigation, the agency encourages the parties to reach an informal settlement.229 
If a formal investigation of the allegations is necessary, EPA may request 
information from or conduct an on-site review of the recipient.230 Should 
EPA find that a recipient has engaged in discrimination, the agency's 
main remedy is termination of the recipient's funding.231 The agency can-
not provide any direct relief or attorneys' fees to the complainant.232 
D. EPA's Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative 
Complaints Challenging Permits 
1. Introduction 
There has been much controversy about the amount of evidence needed 
to prove disparate impact discrimination under Title VI. In February 1998, 
EPA promulgated a controversial Interim Guidance to help the agency's 
Office of Civil Rights resolve a number of pending Title VI complaints.233 
This Subpart will briefly discuss the substance of the Interim Guidance, 
and Subpart E will explain the political controversy about how to revise 
the Interim Guidance so that it allows for reasonable economic develop-
ment while protecting minority groups. 
2. Disparate and Cumulative Impacts 
While its main purpose is to define what types of environmental deci-
sions cause impermissible disparate impacts, the Interim Guidance does not 
provide clear answers about how EPA will determine whether a recipient's 
action caused adverse disparate impacts against protected minority groupS.234 
The Interim Guidance states that the agency will not use a single methodol-
§ 7.120 (1998); Luke W. Cole, Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: A Brief 
History of Administrative Complaints Under TItle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 309, 314-16, 319 (1994); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27. 
228. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(I) (1998); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27. 
229. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.120(d)(2) (1998); Cole, supra note 227, at 316-17; Mank, 
TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27. 
230. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(a) (1998) (authorizing EPA's Office of Civil Rights to 
conduct compliance reviews); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 27-28. 
231. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (1998); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 28; Mank, Pri-
vate Right of Action, supra note 201, at 22-24. 
232. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130(a) (1998); Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 29; Mank, 
Private Right of Action, supra note 201, at 22-24. 
233. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 2; Mank, TItle VI, supra note 
16, at 40-45; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 789,809. 
234. See Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 40-44; Mank, Environmental Justice and 
TItle VI, supra note 212, at 810-14. 
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ogy for evaluating disparate impacts, but will employ several techniques to 
analyze the "totality of circumstances" in each case.235 The Interim Guid-
ance explains that the agency is more likely to investigate and to find dis-
parate impacts if a proposed facility will be located in a community that 
already has several polluting facilities and currently suffers from a dis-
proportionate amount of pollution.236 Thus, the Interim Guidance indi-
cates that the agency will consider not just impacts from a proposal, but 
will also assess the cumulative burden of surrounding facilities.237 How-
ever, the Interim Guidance does not provide a clear explanation of how 
the agency will measure the cumulative pollution burden.238 
EPA's independent Science Advisory Board ("SAB") has examined 
EPA's methods for measuring both disproportionate impact and cumula-
tive effects in Title VI complaints.239 The SAB found that EPA's new Cu-
mulative Outdoors Air Toxics Concentration Exposure Methodology 
("COATCEM") is an improvement over previous methods and shows 
significant promise. Yet the SAB concluded that COATCEM's applica-
tion to Title VI analysis has not been fully developed and that it is not 
clear whether the approach can be applied within the normal ISO-day 
time for responding to Title VI complaints.240 The SAB has also recom-
mended that the agency examine the potential risk to all populations, 
whether significant or de minimis, before estimating the extent of any 
disproportionate impact.241 
a. Compliance with the Law 
The Interim Guidance explicitly states that "merely demonstrating 
that the permit complies with applicable environmental regulations will 
not be considered a substantial, legitimate justification."242 The Interim 
Guidance suggests that even if a proposed facility complies with existing 
regulations, a recipient may not grant a permit that will cause unaccept-
235. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 9; Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 
42; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812. 
236. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, Environmental 
Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812. 
237. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, TItle VI, supra 
note 16, at 42-43; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812-13. 
238. See Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 812-13. See 
generally EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 9-12. 
239. See SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. EPA, AN SAB REPORT: REVIEW OF DIS-
PROPORTIONATE IMPACT METHODOLOGIES, EPA-SAB-IHEC-99-007 (Dec. 1998) [herein-
after SAB Report]; see also Cheryl Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses of 
Disproportionate Impacts, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1310, 1310-11 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
240. See SAB Report, supra note 239, at 1-3. COATCEM evaluates the cumulative 
impacts of cancer and non-cancer risk separately, and the SAB found that such separate 
analysis was appropriate. 
241. See id. at 3. 
242. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12. See Mank, TItle VI, supra note 
16, at 43. 
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able disproportionate impacts in conjunction with the cumulative burden 
from existing facilities.243 
However, in November 1998, EPA rejected a Title VI complaint 
challenging Select Steel's proposed construction of a steel plant in Flint, 
Michigan because the facility was in compliance with the Clean Air 
Act's health-based National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone 
and lead.244 Some commentators believe that Select Steel demonstrates 
that a permit's compliance with health-based standards will always sat-
isfy Title VI.245 Whether compliance with technology-based or perform-
ance-based standards, as opposed to health-based standards, will defeat a 
Title VI claim also is unclear.246 Until EPA revises its Interim Guidance, 
when or whether a permit's compliance with existing regulatory stan-
dards is sufficient under the statute remains uncertain.247 
b. Mitigation and Justification 
The Interim Guidance strongly encourages recipients to mitigate 
any environmental harms that may cause disparate impacts in order to 
avoid Title VI violations.248 The Interim Guidance also requires recipients to 
select a less discriminatory alternative if it is equally effective in addressing 
the permit applicant's goalS.249 However, EPA's restrictive "equally effective" 
standard for alternatives may allow recipients to use minor differences be-
243. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, Environmental 
Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 812-13. 
244. See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. EPA, to 
St. Francis Prayer Center [Complainant] and Michigan Department of Environmental 
Quality [Recipient), RE: EPA File No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint) (Oct. 30, 1998) 
(dismissing Title VI complaint against Michigan Department of Environmental Quality) 
(on file with author); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 48-50. 
245. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Draft Revision of Guidance for 
Processing Civil Rights Complaints Expected Mid-1999, 29 ENV'T REp. (BNA) 1807 (Jan. 
15, 1999) (reporting the opinion of Professor Richard Lazarus, a member of EPA's Title VI 
Implementation Advisory Committee, that Select Steel suggests compliance with appropri-
ate health-based standards will usually defeat Title VI claim); Mank, Title VI, supra note 
16, at 49-50. 
246. See Hogue, supra note 245, at 1807 (explaining that Professor Richard Laza-
rus, a member of EPA's Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee, believes a permit's 
compliance with either technology-based or performance-based standards that do not 
specify at what level pollution will cause adverse health effects will not necessarily defeat 
a Title VI claim); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 50. 
247. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 44; see also Hogue, supra note 245, at 
1807 (discussing when compliance with existing law will defeat a Title VI claim). 
248. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5, 11-12; Mank, Environ-
mental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 814. 
249. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5,11-12. But see Mank, Envi-
ronmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 822-23 (arguing EPA should use a 
"comparably effective" less discriminatory alternative standard in Title VI cases because 
its "equally effective" standard makes it too easy for recipients to use minor differences to 
reject a less discriminatory alternative). 
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tween sites to exclude sites that could achieve similar goals with fewer 
impacts on minorities.250 
According to the Interim Guidance, if a facility poses a significant 
health risk to minorities despite mitigation efforts, the recipient may still 
provide a substantial, legitimate justification for why the benefits of the 
facility are sufficient to outweigh the cost of the disparate impacts.251 In 
evaluating the proffered justification, EPA will consider the state or local 
government's interest in approving the project, the seriousness of the dis-
parate impacts, whether the permit involves a renewal of an existing fa-
cility "with demonstrated benefits" or a new project with "more specula-
tive benefits," and whether the project will provide employment or other 
benefits to the particular community that is the subject of the Title VI 
complaint.252 It is at this stage that a brownfield redeveloper can empha-
size the economic and environmental benefits of a project to the sur-
rounding community. However, the Interim Guidance fails to provide any 
guidelines for balancing health risks against economic benefits. 
E. EPA's Response to Controversy over Title VI and Brownfields 
State and local regulators as well as industry representatives have 
strongly criticized the Interim Guidance for failing to define crucial is-
sues, such as when a disparate impact constitutes impermissible dis-
crimination.253 Many contend that uncertainty about how EPA will apply 
the Interim Guidance discourages business from locating in minority ar-
eas for fear that EPA will subsequently decide that a project in a minority 
community causes disparate impacts, and that this uncertainty will espe-
cially affect the redevelopment of brownfield properties.254 In July 1998, 
several mayors, including many Democratic mayors who usually support 
the Clinton Administration, met with EPA Administrator Carol Browner 
to argue that EPA's environmental justice policies, especially the Interim 
Guidance, could threaten their and the agency's efforts to redevelop con-
taminated brownfields.255 The mayors argued that the Interim Guidance's 
250. See Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 823. 
251. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12. 
252. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12. 
253. See FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 59; John H. Cushman, Jr., Pollution Policy is 
Unfair Burden, States Tell EPA, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1998, at 1; Mank, TItle VI, supra note 
16, at 40-44; Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 810. 
254. See, e.g., Stephen Jones & Annop G. Shroff, Environmental Justice COllcems 
Delay Industrial Expallsion, 13 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITlG. STRATEGY 1 (Oct. 1997); 
Catherine M. Ward, Environmental Justice for All: Why There Are Fewer Brownfields in 
White Neighborhoods?, 154 N.J.L.J. 253 (Oct. 26, 1998). 
255. See Letter from Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, to U.S. Conference 
of Mayors (June 18, 1998) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review); Carol 
Browner, Administrator, U.S. EPA, Speech to Environmental Justice Roundtable, Detroit, 
Michigan (July 17, 1998); Connolly, supra note 205, at 658 (reporting that many mayors 
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vague and potentially open-ended definition of disparate impacts would lead 
developers to avoid brownfield redevelopment in minority areas because too 
much uncertainty remains as to which projects are acceptab1e.256 However, 
EPA has asserted that its Interim Guidance is unlikely to restrict brownfield 
development and observed that no citizen has yet filed a Title VI complaint 
against such a project.257 Similarly, many environmentalists and civil rights 
leaders believe that the Interim Guidance permits development in minority 
neighborhoods as long as reasonable efforts are taken to protect minority 
groupS.258 
As a result of this controversy, in October 1998, President Clinton 
signed a moratorium on EPA accepting new Title VI complaints until the 
agency issues a final guidance on Title VI. 259 Congress drafted the mora-
torium to force EPA to revise the Interim Guidance so as to promulgate 
policies that are more favorable to economic development in minority 
communities, including brownfield redevelopment.260 For Fiscal Year 
2000, President Clinton signed legislation retaining the moratorium for 
another year.261 Despite the moratorium on new complaints, many state 
officials, including members of the National Governors Association, re-
main concerned that the Interim Guidance will discourage industry from 
are concerned that EPA's Title VI policies will undermine brownfield redevelopment); 
Jones & Shroff, supra note 253, at 1 (arguing EPA's environmental justice and Title VI 
policies threaten to undermine its brownfield policies). But see Luke W. Cole & Richard 
Moore, Attacks on EPA Unfair, USA TODAY, July 20, 1998, at 14A (arguing EPA's envi-
ronmental justice policies need not hinder brownfields' redevelopment). 
256. See FOREMAN, supra note 15, at 59; Cushman, supra note 253, at 1; Mank, Ti-
tle VI, supra note 16, at 40,44; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, 
at 810; EPA Defends Environmental Justice Policy, Process to Bliley, ENVTL. POL'y 
ALERT, Dec. 30, 1998, at 30-31 (reporting that Congressman Thomas Bliley is concerned 
that Interim Guidance could interfere with brownfield projects). 
257. See David Warner & James Worsham, The EPA's New Reach, NATION'S BUSI-
NESS, Oct. 1, 1998, at 12,17 (reporting interview with EPA Administrator Carol Browner); 
EPA Defends Environmental Justice Policy, Process to Bliley, supra note 256, at 30-31 
(reporting that Ann Goode, director of EPA's Office of Civil Rights, contends that the In-
terim Guidance is unlikely to interfere with brownfield projects). 
258. See Angela M. Baggetta, Environmental Justice: Black Caucus, EPA to Meet 
on Shintech; Dispute May Be Test Case on Title VI Suits, 139 DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA), 
July 21, 1998, at A-I; Cole & Moore, supra note 255, at 14A; Mank, Title VI, supra note 
16, at 40. 
259. The legislation does not affect 15 ongoing investigations. See Appropriations 
Act for Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Inde-
pendent Agencies for Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 
2461 (1998); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 810; Cindy 
Skrzycki, The Regulators: With EPA as Judge-Up Against the Environmental Justice Sys-
tem, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1998, at Fl; Bill Walsh, Law Puts EPA Bias Rules on Hold: 
Industry Targets Racism Probes, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 23, 1998, at A8. 
260. See Skrzycki, supra note 259, at Fl; Walsh, supra note 259, at A8. 
261. See Departments of Veteran Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2000, H.R. 2684, 106th Congo (1999); H.R. 
REP. No. 106-286 (1999). 
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locating in minority areas because the moratorium will not last 
indefinitely.262 
To address bipartisan concerns about the Interim Guidance's vague 
definitions and possible adverse consequences, EPA Administrator Carol 
Browner established a Title VI Implementation Advisory Committee to 
help the agency develop environmental justice policies that are protective 
of minority communities, yet allow for economic development.263 How-
ever, the Advisory Committee has failed to achieve a consensus about 
how to address many Title VI issues.264 Additionally, EPA is using 
brownfield sites in six cities as case studies to examine how the Title VI 
complaint process affects cleanup, economic redevelopment and permit-
ting issues at such sites.265 In 1999, EPA, brownfield developers, environ-
mentalists, and equity advocates finally began working together to create a 
sustainable redevelopment process that addresses growth, environmental 
quality, and equity issues.266 
EPA has suggested that its revised Title VI policy will better address 
brownfield redevelopment issues.267 By the beginning of 2000, the agency 
intends to issue a draft revision of its Interim Guidance on how the 
agency will review Title VI complaints.268 Furthermore, during the fiscal 
year 2000, the agency may promulgate a separate draft guidance sug-
gesting how state and local agencies can avoid such complaints.269 EPA 
plans to issue both guidances as draft documents and to take public 
comments on them before issuing final versions,270 but will not issue either 
as a formal rule.271 
262. See David Mastio, EPA Rule Faces Challenge: Governors to Consider Request 
to Change Environmental Policy, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 23, 1999, at Bl. 
263. See Connolly, supra note 205, at 658; EPA Bungling Leaves 'EnvironmellIal 
Justice' Elusive, USA TODAY, July 20, 1998, at 14A. But see Cole & Moore, supra note 
255, at 14A (arguing EPA's environmental justice policies need not hinder brownfields' 
redevelopment). 
264. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 5-10; 
Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Title VI Advisory Panel Report Sets Out Issues, 
Gives No Recommendations, 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2188 (Mar. 5,1999). 
265. Fiscal 2000 Water and Env't Budget: Hearings Before the SubcolIIlII. on Water 
Resources and Env't of the House Comm. On Transp. and Infrastructllre, 106th Congo 
(Feb. 10, 1999) (Prepared Testimony of Timothy Fields, Acting Assistant Administrator, 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. EPA). 
266. See EPA, Stakeholder Group to Launch New Brownfields Redevelopllle1lt Pro-
gram, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Mar. 24, 1999, at 9. 
267. See David Sive & Lemuel M. Srolovic, Environmental Justice Issues Develop; 
Facility Permits and Civil Rights, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26, 1998, at Sl. 
268. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Agency Planning to Issue Draft of 
Revised Guidance in Late Summer, 30 Env't Rep. (BNA) 178 (May 28,1999). 
269. See Hogue, supra note 245, at dl1. 
270. See id. 
271. See EPA to Revise Title VI Guidance Under Rulemaking Procedures, ENVTL. 
POL'y ALERT, May 5, 1999, at 31 (reporting EPA will follow rulemaking procedures for 
soliciting public comment in revising its interim policy on environmental justice, but will 
not make the guidance legally binding as a rule). 
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VI. PROBLEMS WITH STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS 
There are considerable uncertainties about how EPA will revise its 
Title VI policies. Nevertheless, states can implement several reforms now 
to insure that their brownfield programs comply with Title VI regardless 
of future EPA actions. Before discussing these reforms, it will be helpful 
to identify how brownfield programs typically fail to address discrimina-
tion concerns. 
State brownfield programs typically commit errors of omission. 
First, they generally do not consider whether the approval of a project 
will create disproportionate impacts on minority groups. Second, state 
brownfield programs usually do not consider the cumulative burden of a 
project in conjunction with existing sources of pollution. 
Provisions in state brownfield statutes or regulations that allow 
lower health standards in industrial areas or in areas projected to be non-
residential are also a problem. In light of evidence that minority groups 
are significantly more likely to live in nonresidential areas,272 state 
brownfield statutes or regulations that allow lower health standards in 
these areas raise serious questions under Title VI because such provisions 
may disproportionately increase health risks to protected minority 
groups. 
A. Errors of Omission 
State brownfield programs typically do not address whether projects 
will affect minority groups or examine whether the effects are dispropor-
tionate. State brownfield statutes and regulations implicitly assume that a 
project is acceptable if it meets all applicable federal or state permitting 
requirements. However, the Interim Guidance explicitly states that "merely 
demonstrating that the permit complies with applicable environmental 
regulations will not be considered a substantial, legitimate justification."273 
Even if it complies with existing regulations, a facility may cause unac-
ceptable disproportionate impacts if its pollution is added to the cumula-
tive burden from existing facilities.274 While there are still uncertainties 
about how EPA will evaluate cumulative and synergistic pollution im-
pacts, states should revise their voluntary action programs now at least to 
examine the extent to which a project will add to existing pollution im-
272. See slIpra notes 23, 125 and accompanying text. 
273. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, slIpra note 18, at 12; Mank, Title VI, slIpra note 16, 
at 43; slIpra notes 242-247 and accompanying text. 
274. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, slIpra note 18, at 10-11; Mank, Title VI, slIpra 
note 16, at 42-43; Mank, Environmental Jllstice and Title VI, slIpra note 212, at 812-13; 
sllpra notes 242-247 and accompanying text. 
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pacts in the surrounding area and whether increases in pollution will dis-
proportionately affect minority populations. 
Additionally, state brownfield programs typically focus on the safety 
of the proposed site and do not require the developer to assess alternative 
locations. Most state programs also do not mandate the use of mitigation. 
The Interim Guidance, however, requires recipients to take of all these 
steps. It states that the agency expects a recipient to mitigate any 
significant impacts against minorities.275 If a facility poses a significant 
health risk to minorities despite these mitigation efforts, the Interim 
Guidance requires the recipient to provide a substantial, legitimate 
justification for why the benefits of the facility are sufficient to outweigh 
the cost of the disparate impacts.276 The Interim Guidance also states that 
"a justification offered will not be considered acceptable if it is shown 
that a less discriminatory alternative exists" that is "equally effective in 
meeting the needs addressed by the challenged" proposal.277 
Most states had enacted their voluntary action programs before EPA 
issued its Interim Guidance. Hence, it is not surprising that these pro-
grams do not address the Interim Guidance's concerns about disparate 
impacts, cumulative pollution burdens, mitigation, cost-benefit analysis, 
or evaluation of less discriminatory alternatives. Understandably, states 
may hesitate to revise their programs until EPA issues a final Title VI 
guidance resolving a number of controversial issues. However, Part VII 
argues that states should implement as soon as possible many needed 
changes in their voluntary action programs, even before EPA issues its 
revised Title VI guidance. 
B. Lower Standards in Industrial and Nonresidential Areas 
Since many state brownfield programs allow consideration of a 
site's future use and some explicitly authorize lower health standards in 
nonresidential areas, their policies could violate Title VI if states are 
significantly more likely to approve high-risk projects in minority com-
munities. Because members of at least some minority groups are more 
likely to live in nonresidential areas,278 an environmental justice com-
plainant could argue that policies allowing lower standards in such areas 
constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination. The standard for 
275. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 11; Mank, Title VI, supra note 
16, at 43; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 814; supra note 
248 and accompanying text. 
276. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12; Mank, Title VI, sllpra note 
16, at 43-44; supra notes 251-252 and accompanying text. 
277. EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 5, 12; Mank, Environmental JIIS-
tice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 814-28; supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
278. See supra notes 23, 125 and accompanying text. 
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proving a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VI is relatively 
easy to meet because statistical evidence of significant disparities be-
tween a minority group and a relevant comparison group is often enough 
to raise an inference of causation.279 Hence, states need to reexamine the 
future use provisions in their voluntary action programs to explore 
whether they may cause adverse, disparate impacts to certain minority 
groups. 
While consideration of a site's future use or nonresidential status 
does not inevitably violate Title VI, a state must ensure that voluntary 
action programs that allow lower health standards in nonresidential areas 
do not adversely affect a substantial number of people, including mem-
bers of racial minority groups. Indeed, by ensuring that its future use or 
nonresidential policies do not disproportionately affect racial minority 
groups, a state will likely avoid adverse effects against all neighbors of 
such projects. Because voluntary action programs typically seek to pro-
mote brownfield redevelopment, states have glossed over some difficult 
issues, including alternatives, synergistic impacts, and long-term risks. 
By addressing the Title VI concerns, states are more likely to address the 
difficult issues affecting all populations. 
VII. IMPROVING DATA COLLECTION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN 
STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLYING WITH TITLE VI 
States should implement several reforms now to avoid Title VI 
complaints against brownfield projects. If states implement these re-
forms, EPA should give greater, but not automatic, deference to voluntary 
action programs. 
First, to determine whether brownfield projects might create dispa-
rate impacts on minority groups, states should amend their voluntary ac-
tion programs to require developers to collect data about the racial 
demographics and relative burden of pollution in several neighborhoods 
surrounding brownfield projects.280 States should require developers to 
prepare a community impact statement similar to the environmental im-
pact statement required under the National Environmental Policy Act that 
addresses the environmental and social impacts of a brownfield project, 
as well as possible alternatives and mitigation measures.281 Furthermore, 
states should require developers to consider whether their project will 
279. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 799-801. 
280. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 30-31; 
EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 31-33,96-102. 
281. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1015-16 (proposing CIS). See generally Mank, En-
vironmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212 (discussing consideration of alternatives 
and mitigation under Title VI, the Clean Water Act, and NEPA). 
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cause adverse disparate impacts on a minority group, including an indi-
vidualized risk assessment that examines the specific risks of developing 
the proposed site. Additionally, state agencies should require a developer 
to consider less discriminatory alternatives to a project because that is 
potentially one of the most important ways to avoid harm to minority 
groups.282 A finding of elevated pollution levels or disparate impacts in a 
minority area would not automatically preclude the siting of a project, 
but such evidence would place a greater burden on a developer and a 
permitting agency to justify such a project. Once such a finding has been 
made, a developer or permitting agency should have to show substantial 
need for the project, the unavailability of alternative sites, and strong 
community support. 
While Title VI does not mandate public participation, emerging 
principles of environmental justice demand that the public have an op-
portunity to comment on a community impact statement. Because risk 
assessment is complex and experts often disagree, states should provide 
technical assistance, including grants, to citizen groups, minority groups, 
or local communities to enable them to conduct research to challenge any 
data submitted by industry supporting a brownfield proposal. Both EPA 
and states should fund community monitoring programs to ensure that a 
project complies with all applicable permits. Additionally, states and lo-
cal governments should develop effective community monitoring pro-
grams both to gather data and to address community concerns.283 Finally, 
states should establish procedures for early and meaningful public par-
ticipation in the process for approving a voluntary cleanup plan.284 
While the agency must evaluate each Title VI complaint on its own 
merits, EPA should give greater deference to states that have strong data 
collection and public participation programs. In its revised Title VI guid-
ance, EPA should explicitly encourage states to improve their data col-
lection and public participation programs. 
282. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 815-28 (dis-
cussing consideration of alternatives under Title VI and NEPA). 
283. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 55. 
284. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-41; RE-
PORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 33 (stating "early interven-
tion reduces the possibility that delays will cost industry time, money, and even a competi-
tive advantage in the siting or expansion of new and existing facilities"); NATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NEJAC), U.S. EPA, MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION 7 (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter NEJAC, MODEL PLAN] (proposing government 
agencies "[s]olicit stakeholder involvement early in the policy-making process, beginning 
in the planning and development stages and continuing through implementation and over-
sight"); NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL (NEJAC), U.S. EPA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, URBAN REVITALIZATION, AND BROWNFIELDS: THE SEARCH FOR 
AUTHENTIC SIGNS OF HOPE 20-22 EPA 500-R-96-002 (1996) (stating "[e]arly, ongoing, 
and meaningful public participation is a hallmark of sound public policy and decision 
making"). 
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A. Requiring Developers to Collect Data and Consider Possible 
Disparate Impacts on Minorities 
1. State Mapping Programs for High-Risk Areas 
159 
States should develop mapping programs to identify areas at high 
risk. EPA's Title VI Advisory Committee has encouraged states to de-
velop a preventative "Track 1" program to identify areas in which there 
are disproportionate impacts and to develop mitigation plans to reduce 
such adverse effects; the agency is beginning to distinguish between pre-
ventative "Track 1" programs and "Track 2" programs that address actual 
complaints of discrimination.285 The Track 1 program is intended to 
identify areas with high levels of cumulative pollution and to redress 
such problems before a citizen files a Title VI complaint about an indi-
vidual permit application. In particular, the Committee suggested that 
agencies at all levels of government examine the cumulative effects on 
human health and environment of all pollution sources without regard to 
whether such pollution is exempt from any applicable permitting process 
or law.286 
a. Identifying High-Risk Areas 
There have been several proposals to identify environmental high-
impact areas, to require special data collection in such areas, and even to 
impose a moratorium on construction in such areas. In 1992, then-
Senator Al Gore and Representative John Lewis introduced legislation in 
Congress that would have placed a moratorium on siting new facilities in 
"environmental high impact areas," which were defined as the 100 coun-
ties in the United States with the highest total weight of toxic chemicals 
in the air, water, and land.287 In 1995, an environmental justice bill in the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly would have required the state to list the 
100 highest impact areas in the Commonwealth, to assess any adverse 
health impacts in those areas, to ensure that all groups or individuals in 
those areas were able to participate in the technical process for deter-
mining adverse impacts, to award technical assistance grants, and to 
promulgate regulations to address any significant adverse impacts.288 Un-
fortunately, none of this legislation ever became law. 
285. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 30-3l. 
286. See id. at 43-44. 
287. See H.R. 5326, 102d Congo (1992); S. 2806, 102d Congo (1992); Mank, Envi-
ronmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 353-54. 
288. See H.R. 2321, 180th Gen. Ass., 1995-96 Regular Sess. (Pa. 1995); Carolyn 
Graham & Jennifer B. Grills, Comment, Environmental Justice: A Survey of Federal and 
State Responses, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 253-58 (1997). 
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In 1998 the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia proposed an 
"Environmental Justice Protocol" that would prohibit construction of new 
facilities in any "affected area" where the public health is "substandard." 
The proposal used a radius approach for determining the affected popu-
lation. The proposal defined "affected area" to be a circle a half-mile in 
radius around the facility, but enlarged the circle if it did not contain at 
least one thousand residents.289 The Public Interest Law Center of Phila-
delphia has urged EPA to adopt its radius and public health approach be-
cause of the difficulties of determining cumulative and synergistic 
risks.290 However, there is considerable disagreement about the appropri-
ate size of the radius. Industry prefers a smaller, "fence-line" approach 
that focuses only on those at greatest risk, those living closest to a plant's 
fence-line. There is some value to industry's preferred approach. Current 
siting schemes tend to give too much weight to existing political subdivi-
sions and not enough attention to the concerns of those at greatest risk.291 
Conversely, environmentalists appropriately fear that a small radius will 
exclude larger population groups still at some risk. As a result, the Public 
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia withdrew its initial proposal and has 
solicited additional comments about a revised draft proposal suggesting a 
one-mile radius.292 
While there are disagreements about how to define high-risk areas, 
an imperfect mapping program is likely to be better than none at all. Any 
program that seriously attempts to identify areas with high levels of pol-
lution and tries to correlate them with minority popUlations will help 
states to determine if a proposed brownfield project should receive spe-
cial scrutiny because it will be located in a high-risk neighborhood. 
b. Will Mapping Prevent All Development? 
A mapping program that identifies high-risk areas can help deter-
mine the extent of data collection needed for a project, yet mapping may 
have some undesirable effects. There is the danger that a mapping pro-
gram will falsely identify some areas as high-risk that later turn out to be 
safe for development. Industry and state officials fear that programs to 
289. See Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, "Environmental Justice Proto-
col" (proposed October 1, 1998) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
290. See Letter from Jerome Balter, Director of Environmental Justice Project. Pub-
lic Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, to Elliot Laws, Chair. U.S. EPA Title VI Imple-
mentation Advisory Committee, and Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, U.S. 
EPA, 2 (Apr. 29, 1999) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
291. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188. at 
401-19. 
292. See Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Draft Environmental Justice 
Standard for the City of Philadelphia,"(May 4, 1999) (revised draft proposed one mile 
radius) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review); Public Interest Law Center of 
Philadelphia, "The EPA Needs a Workable Environmental Justice Protocol," (proposed 
Feb. 18, 1999) (on file with Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
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map, screen, or identify minority areas with high levels of pollution will 
discourage business development in minority neighborhoods and are es-
pecially concerned about the impact of mapping for brownfield redevel-
opment.293 Some industry representatives and state governments point out 
that mapping technology often simply identifies areas with large numbers 
of facilities or pollution, but does not measure actual exposure and risk 
levels in particular communities.294 
Due to these risks, mapping should not be used to preclude all de-
velopment in a community. Instead, identifying potentially high-risk ar-
eas should be the first step in a dialogue about what types of brownfield 
redevelopment are appropriate in a community that may suffer from both 
high levels of unemployment and cumulative impacts of pollution. A dis-
tinction should be made between brownfield redevelopment that carries 
high or low risk to a community.295 States should adopt special brownfield 
programs to examine potential low-polluting uses for brownfield properties 
and discuss which types of projects are appropriate in areas with already 
high levels of pollution. 
States should not wait for EPA's revised Title VI guidance and 
should begin identifying areas with potentially high levels of cumulative 
pollution and disproportionate adverse impacts now. A state typically 
must collect demographic and cumulative burden data if a citizen files a 
plausible Title VI complaint. States probably can avoid many Title VI 
complaints if they know before approving a project whether a proposal is 
likely to have disproportionate impacts on minorities. In Select Steel, 
EPA reached a decision rejecting a Title VI complaint within two and 
one-half months because Michigan quickly provided a complete set of 
records justifying its decision and exerted political pressure for an early 
ruling.296 EPA's rapid resolution of the Select Steel Title VI complaint 
suggests that if a state already has data showing that a proposal is un-
likely to have disproportionate impacts against minorities, EPA will 
quickly dismiss a complaint rather than conduct a time-consuming inves-
tigation.297 
293. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMl\fiTTEE, supra note 3, at 68-69. 
294. See id. 
295. See id. at 69. 
296. See Letter from Ann E. Goode, supra note 244 (noting that the U.S. EPA stated 
that it was able to reach a fast but thorough decision because Michigan officials had 
quickly provided the agency with complete records on the original state permit decision); 
Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 49. 
297. Whether EPA's decision in Select Steel was biased by political factors is be-
yond the scope of this Article. See Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 49-50 for a discussion 
of Select Steel. 
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2. Developer Community Impact Statements 
a. Writing Effective Community Impact Statements at 
Reasonable Cost 
States should require developers to write a concise but thorough 
community impact statement ("CIS") about the health and economic im-
pacts of their project, allow citizens to comment on that statement, and 
require a state environmental agency to approve it before the developers 
may undertake a voluntary cleanup. In preparing a CIS, states should re-
quire brownfield developers to collect information about the extent to 
which minorities are disproportionately located near brownfields. Addi-
tionally, if a statute or regulation authorizes lower health standards for 
nonresidential brownfield projects, states should require a developer that 
seeks to apply the lower standards to collect and evaluate information on 
the extent to which minorities are likely to live near such sites. States or 
developers also should collect data on the extent to which minority resi-
dents actually will benefit from new jobs or taxes resulting from redevel-
opment of a brownfield site.298 In addition, states should require a permit 
applicant's CIS to address mitigation measures, the possibility of less 
discriminatory alternatives to the project, and the costs and benefits of a 
project. 
Developers are likely to argue that writing a CIS is too time-
consuming and expensive, but many states already require the collection 
of some data to determine the overall risk to surrounding areas of pro-
posed brownfield projects.299 Several state voluntary action programs al-
ready allow developers to use a site-specific risk assessment and thus 
there is some experience with such studies.3°O A site-specific examination 
of a facility's individual and cumulative pollution burdens potentially 
provides a great deal of information about its risk to surrounding com-
munities, including any special risks it may pose to minority communi-
ties.30l 
Additionally, federal agencies routinely prepare environmental as-
sessments. For major federal projects, the NEPA already requires federal 
agencies or states receiving substantial federal assistance to write an en-
vironmental assessment that considers a proposed project's environmental 
impacts and alternatives to the proposal.302 Several states have mini-NEPAs 
298. EPA's Interim Guidance explicitly considers economic benefits in evaluating 
whether a recipient agency's permit or other decisionmaking creates unacceptable, dispa-
rate impacts against a minority group. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12; 
supra text accompanying notes 251-252. 
299. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
300. See supra notes 94, 109-110 and accompanying text. 
301. See, e.g., Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38. 
302. To determine whether a proposed action is a "major Federal action[ 1 
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or other statutes with similar requirements.303 In ninety-nine percent of the 
cases, the agency prepares a simple fifteen to twenty page environmental 
assessment and then a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI"). Only a 
small number of projects have significant environmental impacts that require 
an agency to prepare a more elaborate environmental impact statement. 
Brownfield developers would normally only prepare a relatively short 
environmental assessment unless the project involves unusual risks. This 
Article proposes to extend the environmental assessment project to 
purely private brownfield projects that are not currently subject to these 
requirements. The special risks posed by brownfield projects justify the 
need for community impact statements in this area. 
While preparing an environmental assessment is costly, it often 
leads to substantial benefits. As a result of writing an impact statement, 
agencies often modify a proposed project to lessen environmental im-
pacts, although they are less likely to cancel a project altogether.304 The 
benefits of conducting an environmental assessment can be greater if a 
developer is required to implement mitigation measures. Though NEPA 
merely requires that an agency evaluate mitigation measures,305 other 
statutes impose substantive mitigation requirements. For example, the 
Army Corps of Engineers frequently requires mitigation measures as a 
condition for obtaining a wetlands permit to achieve the Clean Water 
Act's goal of "no net loss" of wetlands and also requires applicants to 
adopt practicable alternatives if they will cause less harm to wetlands.306 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" requiring an EIS, agencies 
draft an Environmental Assessment (EA) that examines the need for the project, considers 
alternatives to the proposal, discusses the impacts of the proposal and any alternatives, and 
may discuss mitigation measures. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. ill 1999); 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1998) (stating that NEPA requires an agency to consider alternatives to 
the proposed action); Valerie Fogelman, Environmental Impact Statements, in 1 ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 1.07 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1999); Stephen M. Johnson, 
NEPA and SEPA's in the Questfor Environmental Justice, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 565, 570 
(1997); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 819,821-22,829-31. 
303. See Johnson, supra note 302, at 598-99; Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: 
Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REv. 221, 293 
n.358 (1997) (listing 13 states and Puerto Rico as having state statutes or regulations based 
on NEPA that require an agency to consider alternatives); Mank, Environmental Justice 
and Title VI, supra note 212, at 819; see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.448(1)(k) (1997). 
304. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1016. 
305. For instance, NEPA does not require that agencies or private applicants actu-
ally implement mitigation measures, but the lead agency must discuss how such measures 
could minimize any environmental impacts. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens 
Council, 490 u.s. 332 (1990); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(h) (1998); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, 
NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 8.08[10] (2d ed. 1999); Mank, Environmental Justice and 
Title VI, supra note 212, at 819,821-22,829-31. 
306. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.1O(d) (1998) (requiring compensatory mitigation in appro-
priate circumstances); 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (1998) (same); 33 C.F.R. § 230.1O(a) (1998) 
(requiring Army Corps of Engineers to reject wetlands permit if a practicable alternative 
exists that is less damaging to the aquatic ecosystem); Memorandum of Agreement be-
tween U.S. EPA and Department of Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation 
Under Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1990); Friends 
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Furthermore, some state statutes require state agencies to mitigate 
significant impacts.307 
Although the evaluation of less discriminatory, rather than less envi-
ronmentally harmful, alternatives raises different considerations, many 
state and local governments already consider alternatives as part of their 
siting process.308 Collecting additional information about the racial 
demographics of alternative sites to develop or redevelop should not 
prove difficult for recipients. 
States can minimize the costs of data collection by authorizing a 
limited, preliminary inquiry before requiring more extensive data collec-
tion.309 EPA and states usually allow a potential purchaser of commercial 
property to conduct a limited Phase I audit of whether the property has 
been used before in such a way that contamination is likely.310 Phase I 
audits usually involve the review of existing land use information, such 
as a title search or the examination of aerial photographs, to determine if 
a site was used for industrial purposes.3J1 Only if the Phase I audit sug-
gests a significant possibility of contamination must a purchaser or de-
veloper conduct a Phase II audit, which usually involves testing soil or 
groundwater for contamination.312 
Similarly, states should require all brownfield developers to conduct 
a preliminary audit of existing census data on the demographic composi-
tion of the surrounding area and a limited examination of other major 
pollution sources in the area. Only if the quasi-Phase I audit indicates 
that significant minority populations or substantial cumulative pollution 
of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding mitigation through 
off-site purchase of wetlands); MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 305, 
§ 8.08[10]; Marc R. Bulson, Off-Site Mitigation and the EIS Threshold: NEPA's Faulty 
Framework, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 101 (1992). 
307. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(b) (West 1996) (requiring state 
agencies to mitigate or avoid significant environmental impacts when "feasible"); MINN. 
STAT. § 116D.04(6) (1998) (requiring the state to adopt a feasible and prudent alternative 
that is less environmentally destructive); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(1) 
(McKinney 1997) (requiring mitigation to the maximum extent practicable); Johnson, 
supra note 302, at 598-99; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 
831. 
308. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 
348-50 (discussing "super review" and "site designation" models of selecting sites for 
hazardous waste facilities; both models require either the state or developer to create an 
inventory of alternative sites); Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, 
at 819. 
309. See generally Kuehn, supra note 142, at 170; Mank, What Comes After Tech-
nology, supra note 140, at 334-38. 
310. See EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 98, 103-05 (describ-
ing Phase I audits in Baltimore, Maryland and Oregon); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3746.04(B)(3), 3746.07(B) (West 1994); Eisen, supra note 4, at 931-32. 
311. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 931-32; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3746.04(B)(3), .07(B) (West 1994). 
312. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.04(B)(3)(g), 3746.07(B)-(C) (West 
1994); Eisen, supra note 4, at 931-33. 
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exists near a site would a CIS need to include more extensive data col-
lection. 
h. Risk Assessments 
If the proposed project in isolation poses a significant risk of, for in-
stance, a greater than one-in-a-million excess cancer risk, the developer 
should conduct a limited risk assessment of the cumulative pollution bur-
den from other sources in the area. If the preliminary data suggests a dis-
crimination problem, a state agency could demand more extensive data 
collection and risk analysis. A risk assessment may be cost effective in 
the long run if it shows that additional cleanup is unnecessary.313 
Developers are likely to object to the cost of conducting a site-
specific risk assessment that examines risks to significant subpopulation 
groups. Site-specific risk assessments are information intensive and 
hence expensive.314 However, states could minimize risk assessment costs 
by requiring a full-scale risk assessment only if a preliminary assessment 
shows that a facility's lifetime cancer risk exceeds one in a million, the 
standard measure for safety.315 States could adopt a sliding scale for data 
collection that requires more information about demographics or risk if, 
for instance, the facility's carcinogenic risk is greater than a one-in-one-
hundred-thousand lifetime cancer risk. Because a risk assessment that 
examines the cumulative burden of existing sources is more complex and 
expensive than a risk assessment of the proposed facility by itself, states 
should only require a comprehensive examination of risk if the proposed 
facility poses a significant risk or the surrounding area is known to be of 
high risk. 
A limited risk assessment conducted by a developer may miss or ig-
nore significant risks. Site-specific risk estimates can differ by a hundred 
times or more, depending upon various assumptions.316 Because of limi-
tations in modeling and monitoring techniques, individualized risk as-
sessments are often inaccurate and require additional monitoring to in-
crease their accuracy.317 While industry would likely criticize the expense 
of site-specific risk assessments, the very cost and complexity of such 
assessments actually would favor developers with extensive financial and 
technical resources. There is the danger that industry or recipients would 
use favorable assumptions that minimize a proposal's possible risk to 
313. See Gargas & Long, supra note 108, at 226. 
314. See, e.g., Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38. 
315. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
316. See Applegate, supra note 141, at 265-70; Kuehn, supra note 142, at 133-39; 
Rosenthal et a!., supra note 141, at 340-44 (looking at maximally exposed individual near 
a factory rather than a hypothetical maximally exposed individual can reduce estimated 
exposures by a factor of 100 at some sources). 
317. See, e.g., Mank, What Comes After Technology, supra note 140, at 334-38; in-
fra notes 334-339 and accompanying text. 
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minority groups or the public health in generaPl8 Accordingly, states 
need to consider providing technical assistance to community groups to 
allow them to challenge industry data and promote community monitor-
ing programs to ensure that projects are as safe as they are supposed to 
be. Alternatively, a state could pay for a limited risk assessment or could 
perform a risk assessment and have the developer compensate it. How-
ever, community monitoring provides both social and informational 
benefits because it increases the likelihood of adequate data collection by 
promoting public participation, which often encourages more effective 
monitoring by the affected community. 
c. Technical Assistance 
Community groups often lack the technical competence to challenge 
industry safety assumptions.319 Environmental justice advocates argue 
that government should redress this imbalance by providing independent 
technical consultants or grants to community organizations for education, 
monitoring, or critical evaluation of existing data.32o They also have ar-
gued that technical assistance is especially necessary to enable commu-
nity groups in poor or minority neighborhoods to challenge industry 
data.321 
On the other hand, industry and state representatives usually oppose 
such grants or assistance on a number of grounds. They fear such re-
sources will be used for tort suits or other litigation against them.322 In-
dustry and state regulators often argue that it is inappropriate to fund 
such organizations because these grants give the misleading impression 
that the receiving group represents the public interest rather than being 
accountable only to the regulators' small constituencies.323 They also 
contend that government regulators already adequately protect the public 
health.324 
At a minimum, states should provide funding for educational pro-
grams to help local communities understand the processes of public par-
ticipation, environmental permitting, the basic elements of risk assess-
318. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 133-39; Rosenthal et aI., supra note 141, at 
340-44. 
319. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 129-33, 144, 162-63; Mank, Environmelltal 
Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 77-
80. 
320. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; 
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 77-80; REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE, supra note 3, at 39-41. 
321. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 162-63; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title 
VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; Environmental Justice Groups Form Browllfield Advisory 
Board, ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Feb. 10, 1999, at 10. 
322. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 41. 
323. See id. 
324. See id. 
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ment, and community monitoring.325 Furthermore, despite likely opposi-
tion from industry, EPA or states should offer technical assistance to 
community groups or provide grants so community groups can hire their 
own technical experts to examine industry data.326 
Technical assistance grants are currently too small to level the 
playing field. Congress, EPA, and states usually have provided only lim-
ited funding for technical assistance programs and grants.327 EPA has ac-
knowledged that it takes too long for the agency to provide money to 
grant recipients. It has promised to amend its technical assistance pro-
gram to provide small start-up grants of $5,000 to allow recipients to ini-
tiate projects.328 Even with proposed reforms, EPA's technical assistance 
grants do not sufficiently level the playing field with industry.329 Both 
EPA and state agencies rely heavily on regulated industry for information 
about the risk of chemicals.330 Additionally, state agencies normally have 
greater financial and technical resources than community groups.331 Ac-
cordingly, even if states provide some technical assistance to local com-
munity groups, such assistance by itself may not be enough to counter-
balance the far greater technical and financial resources of industry and 
even state regulators.332 
Yet environmental justice advocates argue that even small grants are 
valuable. First, they allow groups to develop computer software needed 
to collect and assess pollution data or to support travel to public meet-
325. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; 
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 79; Environmental Justice Groups Form Brownfield 
Advisory Board, supra note 320, at 10. 
326. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 834-39; 
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 79. 
327. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 835-36, 838; 
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 78-79. Between 1988 and 1998, EPA awarded 202 
technical assistance grants of up to $50,000 to groups to allow them to comment on and 
participate in Superfund remedy decisions. See OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL 
RESPONSE, U.S. EPA, SUPERFUND REFORMS ANNUAL REPORT FY 199825,43, EPA-540-
R-99-002 (1999). 
328. See Jennifer Silverman, Top Superfund Issues of 1999, 22 CHEM. REG. REp. 
(BNA) (Jan. 22, 1999) (quoting Stephen Luftig, director of EPA's Office of Emergency and 
Remedial Response); see also OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, U.S. 
EPA, SUPERFUND REFORMS ANNUAL REpORT FY 1998, supra note 326, at 25, 43 (EPA 
plans to issue an amended rule in 1999 to simplify its technical assistance program for 
Superfund sites). 
329. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 144, 162-63; Mank, Environmental Justice and 
Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 408; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, 
supra note 212, at 836-38; Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 76. 
330. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons From Federal Pesticide Regulation on the 
Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369,436-37 
(1993); Kuehn, supra note 142, at 144. 
331. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 162-63; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title 
VI, supra note 212, at 837. 
332. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 835-36, 838; 
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 78-79. 
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ings.333 Furthermore, providing technical assistance sends a message to 
community groups that their views are important. Thus, technical assis-
tance grants are valuable both as a means for community groups to check 
the accuracy of industry or state data and to enhance their ability to par-
ticipate in the environmental decision-making process by asking appro-
priate questions about technical issues. 
d. Community Monitoring Programs 
States should fund meaningful community monitoring programs. 
Community monitoring programs should be less controversial than tech-
nical assistance programs because they do not necessarily imply that in-
dustry data is biased, but simply that more information would be helpful. 
EPA should provide direct funding for pollution monitoring to local 
communities and encourage states to support local monitoring efforts by 
giving more favorable consideration to brownfield projects that include 
community monitoring. It is important to encourage grassroots monitor-
ing programs because properly trained community residents can often 
collect data as well as professionals and can collect more data because 
they are not constrained by agencies' limited monitoring budgets.334 Im-
proving the ability of communities to monitor compliance will provide 
additional information about the amount of pollution in the area. It would 
also allow communities to determine whether current mitigation meas-
ures are working effectively. Additionally, EPA has recently suggested 
that brownfield projects should be reevaluated every several years over a 
period of twenty or more years to determine if the projects meet their 
initial economic and pollution expectations.335 
EPA and some states already provide some funding for community 
monitoring, but more needs to be done. EPA already has an Environ-
mental Monitoring for Public Access and Community Tracking 
("EMPACT") Grants Program that provides grants to local communities 
to establish community monitoring systems. In fiscal year 1998, the 
Office of Environmental Justice expected to award $3.5 million to local 
governments to establish pilot programs for its enhanced EMPACT pro-
gram.336 
While financial constraints are likely to continue, new technology 
now allows for better and cheaper monitoring.337 For instance, EPA is 
developing computer programs such as LandView, a desktop mapping 
system that includes database extracts from the agency and can be 
333. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 40-41. 
334. See Collin & Collin, supra note 166, at 82. 
335. See EPA, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 113. 
336. See u.S. EPA, Environmental Monitoring for Public Access and COllllllunity 
Tracking (EMPACT) (last modified June 2, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/empact.htm>. 
337. See Collin & Collin, supra note 166, at 82. 
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downloaded from the Internet, that identify potential emission sources.338 
Furthermore, the agency and many states are already beginning to make 
information about facilities available to the public through the Internet.339 
EPA has recognized that more needs to be done to encourage com-
munity monitoring. The agency is considering including language in its 
forthcoming revised Title VI guidance that would instruct regional staff 
to provide enforcement training to citizens and environmental justice 
groups.340 However, industry opposes such community data collection 
efforts because amateur community groups may intentionally or acci-
dentally obtain inaccurate data, money would be better spent on agency 
monitoring efforts, and such data could be used for litigation against in-
dustry.341 While there are some risks that community monitoring data 
could be misused, community monitoring will both provide more infor-
mation and give communities a greater sense of control over their health 
concerns. 
EPA should provide greater direct funding for local monitoring pro-
grams because existing funding for EMPACT is inadequate. Additionally, 
the agency should encourage states and developers to establish and fund 
effective community monitoring programs by allowing brownfields proj-
ects near residential areas only if such monitoring is available. If they 
really believe their projects are safe, developers should welcome com-
munity monitoring projects that can confirm that their facilities pose no 
significant harm to surrounding populations. 
B. Rebutting Discrimination Claims: States Need to Address the Gaps in 
EPA's Title VI Policies 
Title VI allows states to give developers the opportunity to justify 
otherwise unacceptable impacts on a minority group. While some civil 
rights advocates might argue that adverse disparate impacts on protected 
minority groups should never be allowed, Title VI and VII cases suggest 
that defendants may be able to justify disparate impacts through safety or 
efficiency justifications, significant cost savings, or the unavailability of 
physically suitable alternative sites.342 Accordingly, the Interim Guidance 
338. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 22; 
LandView III Specialized Computer Mapping Application (last modified July 7, 1999) 
<http://www.census.gov/geo/www/tigerflandview.html>. 
339. See generally Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything; Revolu-
tionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Inter-
net, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 277 (1998). 
340. See Environmental Justice Guide Eyes Citizen Enforcement Training, ENVTL. 
POL'y ALERT, Nov. 3, 1999, at 33-34. 
341. See id. at 33-34. 
342. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 806-07,823-
28. 
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allows the construction of a facility if the federal grant recipient can pro-
vide a substantial, legitimate explanation of how the benefits of the facil-
ity sufficiently outweigh the cost of these disparate impacts.343 
While civil rights advocates have criticized the use of cost as a 
justification for practices having discriminatory effects, courts have al-
lowed cost to be used by defendants as a justification.344 Accordingly, 
EPA will probably allow states to use economic benefits to justify a proj-
ect that meets minimum safety standards, such as a maximum one-in-ten-
thousand lifetime cancer risk. 
Additionally, a developer could argue that it chose a location in a 
minority neighborhood rather than an alternative site because technical or 
geological factors offered greater safety in the minority neighborhood.345 
Courts have found that safety is a valid justification for a policy that af-
fects a minority group disproportionately but incidentally. However, us-
ing geological or technical criteria should not in general adversely affect 
minorities because no evidence supports the proposition that minority 
areas are located in disproportionately safer locations than majority ar-
eas.346 A legitimate and neutrally administered policy focusing on techni-
cal criteria could even reduce the incidence of discriminatory siting.347 
Nevertheless, to ensure that cost and safety justifications do not 
provide a pretext for discrimination, states should require developers of-
fering a business justification to examine a project's economic benefits 
and risks to each significant subpopulation group. While brownfield proj-
ects are frequently located in minority neighborhoods, environmental 
justice advocates contend that these communities receive few economic 
benefits yet bear most of the risks. Accordingly, a developer should per-
form an analysis of the costs and safety of the project for each subpopu-
lation to ensure that minorities do not disproportionately bear the burdens 
of a project while reaping few of the rewards. If a preliminary analysis 
suggests that a minority group bears a disproportionate share of the costs 
and health risks, a state should require a more detailed cost or safety 
justification. 
Furthermore, a developer using an economic or safety justification 
ought to have the burden of demonstrating that no less discriminatory 
alternative brownfield sites would meet its business needs. A developer 
should be able to reject an alternative site that fails to meet the essential 
needs of its business, but should not be permitted to use insignificant dif-
ferences to reject an alternative site that would cause substantially less 
harm to minority groups. Title VI and VII case law places the burden on 
343. See EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 12; supra notes 251-252 and 
accompanying text. 
344. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 806, 823-26. 
345. See id. at 806-07, 826-28. 
346. See id. 
347. See id. 
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the plaintiff to rebut a defendant's legitimate business justification by 
demonstrating that it is a pretext for discrimination or that a less dis-
criminatory alternative exists that would meet the defendant's legitimate 
business needs, including reasonable cost and safety goals.348 This shift-
ing of burdens also makes sense because developers have the best infor-
mation about alternatives.349 However, a state is free to place a greater 
burden on developers that seek to enjoy the advantages of a voluntary 
cleanup program by requiring them to show an absence of less discrimi-
natory alternatives. 
This proposal does not fully address the difficult issue of balancing 
the economic benefits of a project against its costs. Still, by requiring an 
analysis of the costs and benefits to each significant subpopulation, this 
proposal would expose projects that provide small benefits but a high 
burden of risk to a minority community. Once this information is avail-
able, the agency, developer, and community will have a better opportu-
nity to engage in a public dialogue about weighing these risks and 
benefits. 
C. Increasing Public Participation to Address Pretext and Less 
Discriminatory Alternatives 
To avoid successful Title VI claims, a state must ensure that its 
siting and permitting processes do not exclude community input into the 
decision-making process. While brownfield locations already exist and 
are already polluted, a developer should have to explain why it is appro-
priate to redevelop that site rather than possible alternative sites. Ac-
cordingly, voluntary action programs should not ignore the need to con-
sider alternative sites even though consideration of alternatives does in-
volve some additional cost. State policies restricting public participation 
in environmental decision-making are short-sighted because they in-
crease the likelihood that local residents will file a Title VI complaint.350 
Instead, a state should require community involvement and public par-
ticipation early in the permitting process to consider mitigation meas-
ures, the costs and benefits of a project, and especially any less discrimi-
natory alternatives. States should create citizen advisory boards com-
posed of a diverse range of stakeholders to facilitate early and meaning-
ful public participation by a wide range of citizens.351 Citizen groups, 
348. See Georgia St. Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 
(11th Cir. 1985) (stating that plaintiff must present "equally effective" alternative sites); 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 128 (concluding 
that plaintiff failed to present specific alternative sites); Mank, Environmental Justice and 
Title VI, supra note 212, at 808-09, 822-23. 
349. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 820-42. 
350. See id. at 840-43. 
351. See Gauna, supra note 182, at 57-65 (discussing use of advisory committees to 
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those neighbors most affected by a project, minority groups, and local 
community leaders should have the opportunity to offer suggestions for 
improving brownfield proposals to enable developers to fine-tune these 
projects so they produce greater benefits to the community at lower 
risk.352 Even if EPA does not require early participation programs, states 
should adopt them as a matter of good policy. 
Increasing public participation in the approval of brownfield proj-
ects ought to be a goal upon which everyone can agree. While its mem-
bers have disagreed about many issues, EPA's Title VI Advisory Com-
mittee has encouraged states to adopt policies promoting early and 
meaningful participation by community groups.3S3 Community input can 
improve environmental decision-making by providing additional data 
about potential sources of contamination and likely exposure pathways, 
including sensitive subpopulations.354 
However, there likely will be disagreement between environmental 
justice groups and developers over whether community groups should 
have an advisory role or an actual veto. Environmental justice groups 
believe that EPA or states should require developers to obtain approval 
from community groups to utilize lower standards for industrial level 
cleanups.355 Conversely, industry as well as most state and federal regu-
lators would strongly oppose giving veto power to a single or even a 
majority of participating community groups. A possible solution would 
be to place a heightened burden of justification on a decision if a major-
ity of community groups participating in a community advisory group 
oppose a project. 356 
Controversy also surrounds the issue of whether EPA should defer 
to states or local governments that have programs promoting early and 
meaningful public participation.3S7 State and industry members of EPA's 
address environmental justice issues); John C. Duncan, Multicultural Participation in the 
Public Hearing Process: Some Theoretical, Pragmatical, and Analeptical Considerations, 
24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169,238-41 (1999). 
352. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-42; 
Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 73-77. 
353. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 11-13, 
33; Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Title VI Advisory Panel Report Sets Ollt Isslles, 
Gives No Recommendations, supra note 264, at 2188; see also EPA, SUSTAINABLE 
BROWNFIELDS, supra note 26, at 51 (recommending "early, adequate, and meaningful 
community involvement in the [brownfield] decision-making process"). 
354. See U.S. EPA, RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND: VOLUME 1-
HUMAN HEALTH EVALUATION MANUAL SUPPLEMENT TO PART A: COMMUNITY 
INVOLVEMENT IN SUPERFUND RISK ASSESSMENTS (1999). 
355. See Environmental Justice Groups Form Brownfield Advisory Board, ENVTL. 
PoL'Y ALERT, Feb. 10, 1999, at 10. 
356. See Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 75-76 (proposing process for EPA's 
Project XL that allows stakeholders in public participation scheme to increase scrutiny of 
the proposal if a majority opposes project). 
357. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842; Kenneth 
Warren, Environmental Justice Revisited, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 17, 1998, at 7. 
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Title VI Advisory Committee have argued that EPA should give more 
deference to state decisions that include proactive public participation 
efforts such as early community involvement and a community impact 
statement. Environmental justice advocates, on the other hand, have 
questioned whether the agency should establish special incentives for 
state and local governments to comply with the law.358 However, a serious 
issue arises as to whether the agency has the legal authority to give such 
deference when a Title VI complaint alleges that a state or local agency 
has violated the civil rights of minority groups protected by Title VI. 359 
Furthermore, while the agency should give greater deference to a deci-
sion supported by broad popular involvement, EPA should not automati-
cally defer to any state action that causes significant disparate impacts. 
1. Brownfield Programs Often Limit Public Participation 
Unfortunately, many states limit or do not require public participa-
tion in the approval of brownfield projects.360 They limit or preclude pub-
lic participation to avoid lengthy public debates that may delay and in-
crease the cost of brownfield projects.361 For example, Ohio's voluntary 
action program virtually eliminates public participation in individual 
cleanup decisions on the theory that the public had the opportunity to 
participate in setting state cleanup standards.362 Under Ohio's voluntary 
cleanup program, a certified professional may approve a cleanup plan and 
simply send notice to the state.363 The volunteer does not have to provide 
notice to the public until after the cleanup is completed.364 Furthermore, 
in Ohio, any reports or information about the investigation and cleanup 
of a site remain confidential and are not admissible or discoverable in a 
civil suit or administrative action against the volunteer unless the certified 
358. See REpORT OF THE nTLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 26-29; 
Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842 (discussing proposals by 
state government officials for EPA to give greater deference in Title VI disputes to state 
agencies with programs that encourage public involvement in permitting process). 
359. See REPORT OF THE nTLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 27-28. 
360. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 972 (listing several states not requiring any public 
participation); Bradford C. Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and Redevelopment 
Process, in 1 BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACTICE § 31.02[4] (Michael Gerrard ed., 1998). 
361. See generally Eisen, supra note 4, at 972; Mank, Public Participation in the 
Cleanup and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[4]; Sweeney, supra note 4, 
at 160. 
362. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 972; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and 
Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[4]. 
363. In Ohio, the state retains the authority to audit a cleanup, but does so in only 
25% of sites participating. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10 (1998); OHIO ADMIN. 
CODE § 3745-300-14(D) (1998) (providing for random audits of 25% of sites in which a 
certified professional has issued a no-action letter). 
364. In Ohio, the public has a right to participate in the approval of a cleanup plan 
only if the volunteer applies for a variance from applicable cleanup standards. See OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE § 3745-300-12(H)(3) (1998); Eisen, supra note 3, at 972 n.384. 
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professional responsible for reviewing the cleanup finds a "threat or dan-
ger to public health or safety or the environment" or the state brings a 
criminal prosecution against the volunteer.365 
In many states, the public has only limited rights to notice of a pro-
posed cleanup plan under a voluntary action program. While the type of 
notice varies from state to state, a typical brownfield statute requires a 
developer to notify the state environmental agency and obtain its ap-
proval of the plan, provide a copy of the plan to the local government, 
and publish a short notice of the availability of the plan in a local news-
paper of general circulation.366 Most states do not require individual no-
tice to residents in the host community or even to contiguous property 
owners.367 Many states limit public participation to a short public com-
ment period, often between fourteen and thirty days.368 Only a minority 
of states require a public hearing, and usually a hearing is required only 
if there is a written request.369 
Many states provide for public participation only after the developer 
prepares a voluntary remedial work plan.370 For instance, Rhode Island 
encourages community involvement, but explicitly only requires addi-
tional notice to nearby residents when a site investigation is complete and 
does not give residents an opportunity to participate early in the planning 
process.371 It is usually more difficult to challenge a completed work than 
36S. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.28(C), (D) (1998) (stating information or docu-
ments produced in voluntary action program are not admissible or discoverable in any civil 
or administrative proceeding brought against the volunteer); see also Sweeney, supra note 
4, at 127-28. See generally OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3746.071(B)(I)(c) (1998) (stating 
certified professional must notify Ohio EPA if voluntary cleanup threatens public safety, 
welfare, or health). 
366. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3S, §§ 6026.302(e), 6026.303(h), 
6026.304(n)(I)(i) (West 1999); Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and Redevel-
opment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[1]. 
367. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 974; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup and 
Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[1]. 
368. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2S398.6(i)(I),(2), .7(c)(2) (West 
1999) (providing for 30-day notice and comment period); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2S-S-1I(b) 
(West 1995) (providing for 30-day notice and comment period); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7S-
10-73S (1997) (providing for 30-day comment period); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-1l(a) 
(1998) (providing for 14-day comment period); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 661Sa(h)(S) 
(1997) (providing for IS-day comment period); Eisen, supra note 4, at 973-74; Mank, 
Public Participation in the Cleanup and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, 
§ 31.02[2]. 
369. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 2S39S.6(i)(3) (West 1999) (requir-
ing one or more public meetings for information or comment); IND. CODE § 13-2S-S-11(c) 
(1998) (providing for public hearing upon written request during notice and comment pe-
riod); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.1404 (199S) (providing 10 or more persons may 
request designation of site as "Public Involvement Plan" site); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7S-1O-
73S(2) (1997) (providing for 30-day comment period and for public hearing upon written 
request by "ten or more persons ... or by a local governing body of a city, town, or 
county"); Eisen, supra note 4, at 974--7S, 977; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup 
and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[3]. 
370. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 13-2S-S-11(b) (1998); Eisen, supra note 4, at 100S-0S. 
371. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-S, -11 (1998); Eisen, supra note 4, at 1007-08. 
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one in its early stages because the developer may have taken preliminary 
steps toward construction that make it more difficult to modify the proj-
ect or move it to a different 10cation.372 In several states, the host munici-
pality can demand a public hearing, but citizens do not have the right to 
require a hearing.373 Giving participation rights only to the host munici-
pality is problematic because it may not protect the rights of all those 
affected by a proposal since elected officials may not truly represent 
certain potentially affected groups.374 Even the rights of host municipali-
ties are limited in many states since they may not replace statewide ge-
neric cleanup standards with different cleanup standards.375 Only Califor-
nia gives local communities or counties the presumptive authority to de-
termine a site's future use, subject to state approval at a hearing.376 Ac-
cordingly, local communities may not have sufficient authority to protect 
vulnerable minorities. 
Current public participation procedures are inadequate because they 
provide no mechanisms for encouraging the poor and disempowered to 
participate. An active public participation policy that encourages dia-
logue by a wide range of citizens is needed. Several states require the 
state environmental agency that receives comments to consider and per-
haps respond to any public comment that raises significant issues.377 
However, no state requires an agency to reject a cleanup plan in the face 
of substantial public opposition.378 On the other hand, allowing local 
community groups veto authority over controversial projects may only 
increase the tendency of developers to avoid wealthy and politically 
powerful areas and to site undesirable facilities in poor, minority neigh-
borhoods that are often politically powerless.379 
372. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1004-09; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 711. 
373. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 324.20120d(3)(c)(i)-(iii) (West 1999) (city, 
township, village, or local health department can demand a public hearing; state in its dis-
cretion may require public hearing if it believes significant public interest would benefit or 
if appropriate); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (West 1999) (municipality can de-
mand public hearing if developer elects site-specific cleanup criteria); Eisen, supra note 4, 
at 972. 
374. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1011. 
375. See id. at 1004-09. 
376. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398(d)(2) (West 1999); Eisen, supra 
note 3, at 975 n.392, 1005. 
377. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25398.6G) (West 1999); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 13-25-5-11(c) (West 1998); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 324.20120d(5)(e) (West 
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-735(3) (1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 465.320(3), .325(4)(d) 
(1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-19.14-11(a) (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615a(h)(5) 
(1997); Eisen, supra note 4, at 975-76 n.393; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup 
and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[2]. 
378. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 975-76; Mank, Public Participation in the Cleanup 
and Redevelopment Process, supra note 360, § 31.02[2]. 
379. See Arnold, supra note 23, at 27; Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: 
Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Envi-
r01l1nental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REv. 775, 833-37 (1998). 
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Instead, an intermediate policy is needed that actively promotes 
participation by a diverse range of voices without giving anyone group 
veto power. One way to reduce the impact of wealth in siting decisions is 
to have an open process that requires the consideration of alternative sites 
and encourages a wide range of participants. Accordingly, public opposi-
tion ought to be considered when states and EPA review a proposed vol-
untary action project, but only if a wide range of voices are able to par-
ticipate and alternative sites are considered. 
Under a new brownfields act, North Carolina now provides a sixty-
day notice and comment period in which members of the public can 
comment on a proposed brownfield project, "including methods and de-
gree of remediation, future land uses and impact on local employment."38o 
Any member of the public may petition for a public hearing, but the 
North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources has 
discretion to hold a hearing based on its assessment of whether "there is 
significant public interest in the proposed brownfields agreement."381 The 
statute requires the Department to consider public comments received 
during the comment period or at a public meeting in approving a 
brownfield project, especially "written comment that is supported by 
valid scientific and technical information and analysis."382 While North 
Carolina's procedures for ensuring public participation in the approval of 
brownfield projects are superior to most states, even these procedures do 
not guarantee early public involvement in formulating development and 
cleanup plans.383 States need to promote such early involvement. 
2. Promoting Early and Meaningful Participation: Creating a 
Partnership Between States and EPA 
Public participation is likely to be meaningful only if community 
groups may participate early in the process so they can influence a proj-
ect's design and location.384 Environmental justice advocates therefore 
favor early participation in the decision-making process. EPA's revised 
Title VI guidance should encourage states to establish community advi-
sory boards that participate early in the planning process for redevelop-
ing brownfield projects. In its planned Guidance advising states on how 
to comply with Title VI, EPA should urge states to include a diverse 
380. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-31O.34(b) (1997); see also Hawley, supra note 8, at 
1035,1044. 
381. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-31O.34(c) (1997); Hawley, supra note 8, at 1035, 
1044 (stating North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources must hold 
public hearing on brownfield project if agency considers it in public interest to hold such a 
hearing). 
382. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.34(d) (1997). 
383. See Hawley, supra note 8, at 1045. 
384. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1004-09; McWilliams, supra note 4, at 711. 
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range of citizens on such advisory boards, especially members of minor-
ity groups and those at highest risk from the project.385 
To encourage broad and early participation, states must engage in 
aggressive outreach to embrace a broad spectrum of the public. State 
statutes often only require developers to provide a short notice through 
general circulation newspapers, but most people never read such no-
tices.386 States should require notification in utility bills, the use of com-
munity liaison staff, and notification in languages other than English 
where appropriate.387 Agencies should choose convenient meeting times 
and places for public meetings and conduct public education classes 
about both scientific issues and methods for effective participation in 
agency decisions.388 
EPA and several states have recognized that early participation pro-
cedures can sometimes reduce conflict about and community opposition 
to certain projects. EPA's Advisory Committee on Title VI recommends 
that states include community members early in the decision-making 
process and attempt to resolve environmental justice issues before mak-
ing permit decisions.389 EPA encourages states to create "three-legged" 
networks of governments, businesses, and minority communities to dis-
cuss the racial implications of siting decisions.39o To reduce the number 
of Title VI complaints and to gain favor with EPA, a few states have al-
ready implemented early participation procedures.391 For instance, New 
York has created an environmental justice program and appointed a coor-
dinator to promote community involvement in the state's environmental 
permitting process.392 In November 1998, EPA awarded $100,000 grants 
385. Cf Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 
401-19 (arguing that citizen advisory boards often do not include members of minority 
groups or those at highest risk from pollution). 
386. See REPORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 50-51. 
387. See id. 
388. See id. 
389. See id. at 11-12, 33. 
390. See Cheryl Hogue, Environmental Justice: Permits Cited in Civil Rights Com-
plaints Have Remained Valid, 152 DAILY ENV'T REp. (BNA) A-9 (Aug. 7, 1998); Mank, 
Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, 84~2. 
391. See Pollution in Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the 
House Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 
105th Congo (1998) (testimony of Michael Hogan, New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection) (indicating that New Jersey is adopting "inclusive collaborative process 
to address issues of environmental equity" and an "upfrontJproactive environmental equity 
process" that allows local minority and low-income communities to have "input into the 
permitting process when it is most meaningful, before the permit is issued"); Pollution in 
Minority and Inner-City Neighborhoods: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Congo (1998) (testimony 
of Barry McBee, Chairman of Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission) (indi-
cating that Texas seeks to provide citizens with opportunities for early, meaningful input 
into permitting process); Hogue, Permits Have Remained Valid, supra note 390, at A-9; 
Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, 84~2. 
392. See New York: To Improve Input on Permits, State Creates Environmental Jus-
tice Program, 30 Env't Rep.(BNA), 1114 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
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to four states and one Native American tribe to develop model programs 
promoting environmental justice.393 However, complaints have already 
been made that New Jersey's model program under the grant, the Advi-
sory Council on Environmental Justice, has no real decision-making 
power.394 
3. Community Advisory Boards 
To facilitate early and meaningful community participation, states 
should create citizen advisory boards to provide advice on the siting of 
brownfield projects. A citizen advisory board potentially can provide 
ideas and suggestions about a broad range of issues, including possible 
alternative sites or proposals, community relations, monitoring, mitiga-
tion, and economic development. For example, in 1994, legislation was 
introduced in Congress that would have amended CERCLA to require 
EPA to establish a Community Working Group ("CWG") at each Super-
fund site whenever a state or fifty citizens requested the formation of 
such a group.395 The legislation would have required EPA to select at 
least fifty percent of the members of the CWG from local residents and 
also specified that the agency include particular health and technical ex-
perts.396 Most notably, the CWG could make recommendations to the 
agency about choice of cleanup standards, including the site's future land 
use and whether institutional controls should be used instead of perma-
nent treatment methods.397 However, the proposal died when Congress 
failed to enact a comprehensive Superfund reform bill in 1994. States 
could create groups similar to CWGs to evaluate brownfield proposals.398 
For instance, Pennsylvania authorizes, but does not require, the estab-
lishment of community-based advisory groups on brownfields.399 
While the CWG proposal represented a step in the right direction, 
some environmental justice advocates have argued that it did not go far 
enough to guarantee adequate representation of minority groups or those 
at greatest risk from a facility.4°O They suggested that the CWG member-
ship could include facility owners, potentially responsible parties, work-
ers at the facility, members of the local business community, and local 
393. See Merkel, supra note 206. 
394. See Environmentalists Say Whitman Fails in Promise, RECORD, Northern N.J., 
June 4,1999, at L7. 
395. Fewer than 50 citizens could demand a CWG if they represented at least 20% 
of the population of the locality in which an National Priority List site was located. See 
H.R. 3800, 103d Congo § 102 (1994) (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g)(l)(A». 
396. See id. (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g)(5». 
397. See S. 1834, 103d Congo § 103 (1994) (proposing to amend CERCLA 
§ 117(i»; H.R. 3800 (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g); see also Foster, supra note 
379, at 835-36 (discussing CWG proposal); Ayers, supra note 112, at 1511-12 (same). 
398. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1017-19. 
399. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6026.304(0) (1993). 
400. See infra notes 401-404, 424 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 179 2000
2000] Reforming State Brownfield Programs 179 
government officials who did not necessarily have the same interests as 
those at greatest risk.401 There was a risk, however, that the presence of 
these groups might have prevented the achievement of consensus recom-
mendations and thus weakened the value of any recommendations by the 
CWG to EPA.402 
To avoid the limitations of the CWG scheme, some commentators 
have suggested that states should develop community-based advisory 
boards modeled after the Restoration Advisory Boards ("RABs") that are 
used to solicit community views about military base closures.403 RABs 
have the advantage of a governing statute which requires public involve-
ment throughout the closure process rather than at only one or two points 
in a long process.404 
Whether such a board would have only an advisory function or 
genuine decision-making authority is an important question.405 EPA's case 
studies of seven pilot projects involving twenty separate sites found that 
the level of decision-making authority given to community residents 
varied greatly. Their positions ranged from being voting members of a 
pilot project's site-selection committee to being mere observers.406 The 
proposed Superfund legislation that created CWGs would have required 
EPA to give "substantial weight" to the CWG's recommendations when 
the CWG achieved consensus regarding "the reasonably anticipated fu-
ture use of the land at the facility."407 However, the agency was not bound 
to follow the CWG's proposals.40s If a board is reasonably large and 
sufficiently representative of the community, it may be appropriate to 
give it veto power. A state should at least require stronger justification for 
a project if there is significant public opposition. 
4. How Much Deference Does Public Participation Deserve? 
If states adopt proposals to increase public participation, one can 
argue that EPA should give greater deference to those states' environ-
401. See S. 1834 (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(i»; H.R. 3800 (proposing to 
amend CERCLA § 117(g)); see also Kathy Bunting, Risk Assessment and Environmental 
Justice: A Critique of the Current Legal Framework and Suggestions for the Future, 3 
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 157 (1995). 
402. See Bunting, supra note 401, at 157. 
403. See Eisen, Brownfield Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 1, at 226; 
KibeI, supra note 1, at 617-18. 
404. See 10 U.S.C. § 2705(d)-(f)(I)-(5) (1994 & Supp. ill 1997); Eisen, Brownfield 
Policies for Sustainable Cities, supra note 1, at 226-27 & n.209; KibeI, supra note 1, at 
617-18. 
405. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37; Mank, Environmental Justice and Dis-
criminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 369-70,401-19. 
406. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY REsPONSE, U.S. EPA, 
BROWNFIELDS TITLE VI CASE STUDIES: SUMMARY REpORT 5, 10-11, 500-R-99-003 (1999). 
407. H.R. 3800, § 117(g)(3); S. 1834, § 103 (Version 4, Oct. 3, 1994) (proposing to 
amend CERCLA § 117(1)(3». 
408. See H.R. 3800, § 117(g)(3); S. 1834, § 103. 
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mental decisions because they presumably enjoy broad public support. 
Some state officials want EPA to approve pre-licensing procedures that 
create a shield against any Title VI complaints, or that create a presump-
tion that the complaints lack substance if a state allowed for ample com-
munity involvement.409 
On October 3, 1999, Ann Goode, director of EPA's Office of Civil 
Rights, told a group of state environmental commissioners that the 
agency plans to give considerable deference to states with strong envi-
ronmental justice programs if a Title VI complaint is filed against the 
state.410 Although acknowledging that Title VI does not allow EPA to 
provide states with guaranteed immunity from Title VI complaints, 
Goode stated that the agency will be unlikely to pursue complaints 
brought against states that have a quality program that includes either a 
broad outreach program to identify and address environmental justice 
issues or a narrower public participation program that requires outreach 
to stakeholders affected by an individual permit application.411 While she 
declined to provide details until the agency's top officials reach consen-
sus and issue a revised guidance, Goode also announced that the agency's 
forthcoming revised Title VI guidance will provide several factors that 
the agency will use to evaluate whether a state has a good program.412 In 
response to state concerns that it is unclear what sanctions EPA would 
impose if it finds a state in violation of Title VI, Goode stated that the 
agency almost always seeks to avoid the "nuclear option" of withdrawing 
a state's federal funding.413 
In a close Title VI case, EPA should give some deference to a state 
that is earnestly trying to encourage public participation by a wide range 
of stakeholders and to avoid disparate impacts. Because the agency has 
considerable discretion in what sanction it may impose for a violation 
and tries to avoid imposing sanctions against states that act in good faith, 
it makes sense for the agency to focus on states that do not have a good 
program for addressing Title VI problems or have a pattern of viola-
tions.414 
Nevertheless, EPA's proposal for strong deference goes too far. Title 
VI implies that federal funding agencies should evaluate each complaint 
on the merits. EPA should carefully evaluate each case to determine if a 
409. See Mank, Environmental Justice and TItle VI, supra note 212, at 840-42. 
410. See EPA Plans Strong Deference to State Environmental Justice Programs, 
ENVTL. POL'y ALERT, Oct. 20,1999, at 31-32. 
411. See id. at 32. 
412. See id. 
413. See id. 
414. For example, EPA, on as least two occasions, has considered a statewide re-
view of whether Louisiana's Department of Environmental Quality systematically dis-
criminated against minorities, but EPA has not chosen to proceed with such a contentious 
review. See EPA Moving Toward Statewide Environmental Equity Review in Louisiana, 
ENVTL. PoL'y ALERT, Dec. 30, 1998, at 3. 
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state environmental agency's approval of a brownfield project causes dis-
parate impacts to a protected minority group. In contrast, EPA plans to 
take into account the quality of a state environmental justice program, 
especially the extent to which a state actively encourages the participa-
tion of minorities in the early decisions about where to site a project. 
a. Public Participation Does Not Guarantee Fairness 
The availability of public participation arguably lessens, but does 
not eliminate the possibility of discriminatory decision-making for sev-
eral reasons. First, it cannot be assumed that procedures for increased 
public participation will necessarily address the fundamental differences 
in expertise and resources between minority communities and industry.415 
Environmental agencies may ignore or discount the comments of com-
munity members because of subtle biases against members of minority 
groups or in favor of industry experts with advanced degrees.416 Existing 
public participation practices often ignore the fact that different cultural 
and ethnic groups have different ways of participating or communicating 
that may hinder them in engaging in environmental decision-making.417 
Furthermore, temporal, financial, educational, or language barriers may 
make it more difficult for minorities to participate in such decisions.418 
Because high-income whites may use the political process more effec-
tively than low-income minorities, developers may steer controversial 
projects to poorer communities.419 Second, community advisory groups 
may not be sufficiently representative of the community at large. It is 
important that these boards include a significant percentage of local resi-
dents. For example, proposed legislation that would have established 
CWG to evaluate Superfund cleanup proposals required that at least fifty 
percent of the members of the CWG be local residents.42o 
Third, even if there is a sufficient number of community representa-
tives, the problem of who selects the community representatives remains. 
415. See Kuehn, supra note 142, at 161-62; Gauna, supra note 182, at 31-36,67-69 
(arguing overemphasis on expertise leads decision makers to undervalue the contributions 
of community groups in proposing environmental ideas); Mank, Project XL, supra note 
170, at 76-77. 
416. See Duncan, supra note 351, at 188-93, 209-12 (discussing cultural barriers to 
participation in environmental decisions and arguing environmental agencies are biased in 
favor of so-called "experts"); Gauna, supra note 182, at 31-36,67-69. 
417. See Duncan, supra note 351, at 188-93. 
418. See id. at 193-99. 
419. See Foster, supra note 379, at 800-01, 830 (arguing the private sector singles 
out politically weak lower-class, minority neighborhoods for hazardous waste facilities); 
Mank, Ellvirollmelltal Justice alld Discrimillatory Sitillg, supra note 188, at 349-50, 368-
69 (arguing that wealthy communities often use public participation procedures to block 
controversial or undesirable projects and therefore developers tend to steer unpopular proj-
ects to politically vulnerable poor and minority communities). 
420. See H.R. 3800, § 102 (proposing to amend CERCLA § 117(g)(5)); Eisen, su-
pra note 4, at 1018 n.629. 
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At one extreme, states could allow volunteers to select members of the 
advisory board. For instance, in Project XL, EPA allows the company 
proposing the project to choose stakeholders. The agency ultimately re-
views the fairness of the selection process after the final proposal is sub-
mitted to the agency.421 Such a procedure is unacceptable, however, be-
cause there is no guarantee that an applicant will pick a representative 
range of community leaders. It is more appropriate to have state envi-
ronmental agencies choose members of advisory boards. State environ-
mental agencies are at least somewhat accountable to the public because 
of the requirements for public hearings, public access to agency docu-
ments through state freedom of information laws, and the selection of 
agency heads by elected officials. 
Fourth, the criteria for selection of appropriate community repre-
sentatives usually represent the greatest challenge in establishing an ef-
fective citizen advisory board.422 To assist agencies in choosing a diverse 
range of stakeholders, states should enact legislation or regulations that 
contain specific criteria for selection to prevent arbitrary decision-
making. Selection procedures for community advisory boards usually 
require that a board include environmental scientists or engineers, health 
experts, elected officials, and some community representatives.423 Be-
cause members of minority groups are often poor and not involved in 
politics, many environmental justice advocates are skeptical about 
whether CWGs or similar community advisory boards will be sufficiently 
representative of the citizens at highest risk from a project.424 
b. Title VI Provides No Support for Automatic Deference 
Title VI provides no basis for EPA automatically to defer to states 
that have public participation programs. Under Title VI and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, EPA enjoys significant discretion in deciding 
Title VI complaints, but its decisions are subject to very limited judicial 
review to prevent arbitrary and capricious decisions.425 Title VI requires 
421. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects: Notice of Modifications to 
Project XL, 62 Fed. Reg. 19,872, 19,878-79 (1997); Mank, Project XL, supra note 170, at 
73-74. 
422. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37; Mank, Environmental Justice and Dis-
criminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 369-70,401-19. 
423. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37 (discussing selection and role of citizen 
advisory boards); Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting, supra note 188, 
at 401-19 (arguing community-based siting boards often do not adequately represent mi-
nority groups or those at highest risk, but should do so); Mata, supra note 303, at 450-51, 
458 (proposing separate technical review board of technical experts and local review board 
of local citizens). 
424. See Foster, supra note 379, at 833-37; Mank, Environmental Justice and Dis-
criminatory Siting, supra note 188, at 401-19 (arguing community-based siting boards 
often do not adequately represent minority groups or those at highest risk). 
425. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715 (1979) (suggesting 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 183 2000
2000] Reforming State Brownfield Programs 183 
EPA to find a violation if a state makes a decision that causes significant 
disparate impact and lacks any legitimate justification.426 
While some environmentalists want to give community groups veto 
power over proposals, such a grant of power should be approached with 
caution. Nothing in Title VI requires that states create a local community 
advisory group or give it such veto power as long as a project does not 
create a significant disparate impact. As a matter of policy, neither states 
nor EPA should give veto power to a single community group because it 
may not be representative of the entire community.427 At most, a citizen 
board should have a veto power only if it is broadly representative of a 
community. Even if a board is representative, it is probably better to al-
low a state environmental agency to review its decisions to ensure that it 
makes consistent determinations. Because they are subject to public 
scrutiny and supervision by elected officials, state environmental agen-
cies are less likely to be corrupted by political influence than a relatively 
small community advisory board. 
c. EPA Should Give Limited Deference to States with Good 
Public Participation Programs 
If a state adopts effective and meaningful procedures encouraging 
early participation, EPA should take such participation into account when 
reviewing a Title VI complaint. Because the agency could presume that 
the complainant's views were considered by the state agency, it could 
place a higher burden on the complainant to demonstrate that the state or 
local agency unfairly ignored important evidence of discriminatory im-
pact.428 For instance, if a state involves the public in decisions about a 
site's future use, then there should be a greater presumption that the site 
will be used for the agreed purpose.429 EPA should be careful, however, to 
insure that a state or local government considered the project's risks and 
benefits, not just to the general population, but also to each significant 
subpopulation that might be adversely affected.430 
EPA could give more deference to decisions that include early 
community involvement by shifting the burdens of production and proof 
to the complainant to show that the state failed to consider or suitably 
Title VI generally does not allow private suits against the federal government); Fisher, 
supra note 161, at 317 n.158 (arguing neither APA nor Title VI usually allow complainant 
to challenge EPA's dismissal of Title VI complaint); Mank, Title VI, supra note 16, at 29 
(same). 
426. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 795-96, 799-
802,807. 
427. See Eisen, supra note 4, at 1019. 
428. See generally REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, 
at 36; Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-42. 
429. See Ayers, supra note 112, at 1511-12. See generally Mank, Environmental 
Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842. 
430. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 842. 
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address significant disparate impacts despite the presence of a well-
functioning public participation program. Conversely, if there is substan-
tial opposition from the affected communities, especially those at great-
est risk, EPA should place a greater burden of justification on the recipi-
ent. This type of burden-shifting was contemplated by the proposed leg-
islation to create CWGs which would have required EPA to give "sub-
stantial weight" to the Group's recommendations, but would not have 
bound the agency to the CWG's proposals.431 In a close case where evi-
dence of disproportionate impact is disputed, EPA should consider 
whether a state consulted a wide range of stakeholders and especially 
whether the immediate community had a say in the decision-making pro-
cess. If a state agency fairly considered alternatives proposed by the 
public, but concluded that cost, safety, or other valid non-discriminatory 
business justifications precluded the siting of the facility in the alterna-
tive location, then EPA should give some deference to the recipient's 
policy judgment.432 While a brownfield is fixed at one location, the deci-
sion whether to redevelop it or redevelop an alternative location raises all 
of the issues that normally accompany siting decisions. 
Additionally, rather than automatically deferring to states with good 
public participation programs, the agency could encourage states to pro-
mote public participation by expediting the agency review of a Title VI 
complaint if a state or local government has an effective public partici-
pation program. An expedited review can be justified by the presumption 
that a state or local government with an effective public participation 
program is more likely to create a well-developed public record, allowing 
for a decision without extensive investigation.433 For example, EPA 
justified its expedited review of the Select Steel complaint on the grounds 
that Michigan provided a detailed record that allowed the agency to reach 
a quick decision.434 
VIII. CONCLUSION: STATES SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN 
ADDRESSING TITLE VI CONCERNS ABOUT BROWNFIELD PROJECTS 
The environmental justice movement has raised serious concerns 
about the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Environmental justice advo-
cates fear that this redevelopment may disproportionately affect minority 
and low-income populations because most brownfields are concentrated 
in minority and lower-income neighborhoods. This problem is exacer-
bated by the fact that state brownfield programs typically do not consider 
whether a project will have a disproportionate impact on minority 
431. See supra note 407 and accompanying text. 
432. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 826, 828. 
433. See REpORT OF THE TITLE VI ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
434. See Mank, TItle VI, supra note 16, at 49. 
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groups. State brownfield programs also usually do not consider the cu-
mulative burden of the project and existing sources of pollution. Fur-
thermore, these programs are systemically flawed because they often al-
low lower health standards in industrial areas or in projected nonresiden-
tial areas. Because minorities are more likely to live in these areas, state 
brownfield programs may disproportionately increase health risks to mi-
nority groups, raising serious discrimination concerns under Title VI. 
EPA is currently revising its Title VI policy, but states do not need 
to wait for the agency to finish this process before fixing their brownfield 
programs. First, when making a preliminary assessment of whether there 
is a prima facie case of discrimination, states must identify high-risk ar-
eas where both cumulative pollution burdens and minority populations 
are high. A state program that identifies high-risk minority areas would 
not prevent brownfield redevelopment in such communities if a developer 
could offer good reasons for a project.435 One way a developer could meet 
this requirement would be to prepare a community impact statement. In 
the impact statement, states should require the developer to examine 
mitigation measures, the costs and benefits of projects, and the existence 
of less discriminatory or environmentally damaging alternatives. States 
could minimize the cost of collecting demographic and cumulative pol-
lution data by allowing brownfield developers to conduct a less expensive 
Phase I audit to determine if more extensive research is necessary. To 
help communities provide meaningful comments in response to a com-
munity impact statement, states could provide technical assistance to 
community groups. Furthermore, to ensure that developers fulfill their 
promises, states should provide funding to develop effective community 
monitoring programs. 
Second, a Title VI defendant may refute a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact by proffering a legitimate non-discriminatory business 
justification for a practice causing an adverse impact. In response to this 
part of the statute, states should amend their voluntary action programs to 
require a developer to explain the economic 'and safety justifications for 
the project and how it affects each significant minority subpopulation. An 
analysis of the project's benefits and risks to particular subpopulations 
will encourage developers to address the health and economic needs of 
all members of a community. 
Finally, states should develop procedures to promote early and 
meaningful public participation in the approval of voluntary cleanups and 
brownfield projects. States have an incentive to adopt public participation 
procedures because citizens that have the opportunity to participate in a 
meaningful decision-making process may be less likely to file a Title VI 
complaint.436 To encourage public participation, states should establish 
435. See supra notes 251-252, 295, 342-349 and accompanying text. 
436. See Mank, Environmental Justice and Title VI, supra note 212, at 840-42; su-
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programs to fonn citizen advisory boards composed of a diverse range of 
stakeholders. These boards would facilitate public evaluation of the suit-
ability of projects by a wide range of citizens. A diverse group of citizens 
should have either the opportunity to serve on a board or to comment on 
proposals. Even if EPA does not encourage such early participation pro-
grams, states should adopt them. 
When evaluating a Title VI complaint against a state or local gov-
ernment, EPA should examine whether the state or local government con-
sidered community views about a project's risks and benefits to different 
subpopulations. EPA should give more deference to decisions that had 
early community involvement and a community impact statement. If the 
public had a reasonable opportunity to participate in the selection and 
approval of a project, EPA could increase the burden on the complainant 
to explain why the project creates unacceptable disparate impacts in spite 
of that participation. However, while increasing public participation is 
highly desirable, EPA should not automatically dismiss Title VI com-
plaints against states with public participation programs, because such 
participation does not necessarily prevent disparate impacts against mi-
norities. 
Together, the proposals outlined above would reduce the chances 
that a brownfield project would disproportionately harm racial minority 
groups. Minority and low-income communities need more information 
and a greater opportunity for meaningful participation. While potentially 
costly in some instances, the proposals can be implemented in a cost-
sensitive manner by EPA and states to allow reasonably safe brownfield 
projects to go forward. If developers provide comprehensive information 
about the risks and benefits of brownfield redevelopment and alternative 
projects, a local community can decide which types of projects will pro-
vide long-tenn benefits to that neighborhood. 
Despite the advantages of refonning their brownfield programs, 
many states are likely to wait until EPA issues its long-delayed guidance 
on Title VI. It is important to address the likely advantages and short-
comings of the impending revised guidance. While some of the details 
remain secret, EPA has suggested that the revised guidance will encour-
age states to develop public participation programs that foster early par-
ticipation, and that the agency will instruct its regional staff to train citi-
zens in collecting community data. These proposals are a step in the right 
direction, but the agency should more aggressively push states to enhance 
opportunities for early and meaningful participation and to make com-
munity data collection an integral part of brownfield decisions. EPA's 
plans to give states strong deference if they have a good environmental 
justice program goes too far in putting administrative convenience ahead 
of the need to consider the merits of individual Title VI complaints. EPA 
pra notes 284, 350 and accompanying text. 
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can take into account a state's overall record when it imposes sanctions, 
but it cannot ignore specific instances of disparate impact discrimination 
merely because a state's record is usually good. Finally, the revised guid-
ance is unlikely to require states to impose specific procedural require-
ments such as a community impact statement. Nevertheless, a CIS is the 
most effective means of forcing applicants to address critical issues, such 
as the extent of any disproportionate impacts, the racial composition of 
surrounding neighborhoods, mitigation measures, or alternatives. To 
protect their vulnerable populations from the potential harms that may 
result from brownfield redevelopment, states will likely need to go be-
yond the letter of the revised guidance and to adopt the proposals in this 
Article. 
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